Consciousness, Attention, and Justification*

Silins, Nicholas; Siegel, Susanna

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0008

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…I am not convinced that visual attention is necessary for warranting visual belief. There are armchair considerations against this claim (Siegel & Silins, 2013). There are empirical reasons to doubt it (e.g., Block, 2013).…”

Section: Epistemic Roles Of Attentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Warrant from transsaccadic vision

Buehler

2020

Mind & Language

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Recently, there has been much interest in epistemic roles of attention, especially in whether visual attention is necessary for warranting (basic) visual belief. Arguably it is not. But attention nevertheless has important roles to play in our warrant from vision. I argue that we must appeal to a competence for shifting visual attention in explaining transsaccadic vision and our epistemic warrant from it. So even if it is not necessary for visual warrant or vision, visual attention plays a central role in both.

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Section: Epistemic Roles Of Attentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Warrant from transsaccadic vision

Buehler

2020

Mind & Language

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“…Recently, however, Siegel and Silins (2014;2019) have argued that, assuming there is perceptual experience outside of attention, such inattentive experience can give reasons for beliefs, and both propositionally and doxastically justify beliefs, about the inattentively experienced objects. Their arguments might also be taken to support the conclusion that, contrary to Attentive Rationalizing, non-attentive experience can rationalize judgement (although Siegel and Silins do not explicity make this further claim).…”

Section: Attention and The Rational Role Of Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

Acquaintance, Conceptual Capacities, and Attention

Nes¹

2019

Acquaintance

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I distinguish two reactions to Russell’s theory of acquaintance, specifically to its claim that perceptual awareness is simpler than and independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of propositional knowledge. The conceptualist response, championed inter alia by John McDowell, argues perception can be a source of knowledge only if conceptual capacities are in play in perception. The relationist response, championed inter alia by John Campbell, endorses Russell’s view that perceptual awareness is non-propositional and even non-representational, yet holds it is a relation to physical objects not sense-data. I here point up an underappreciated convergence between McDowell’s recast, non-propositionalist conceptualism and Campbell’s attention-centric relationism; I show how the former can be defended drawing inter alia on some central claims in the latter.

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“… Providing immediate justification is one kind of epistemic power an experience could have in principle, but not the only kind. For discussion of different types of epistemic power of experiences, see Siegel and Silins (). …”

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confidence: 99%

“… Even in the examples of bypass, the response to evidence may be improper because evidence the subject responds to has less evidential power to support the belief formed in response to it, due to the fact that bypassed evidence retains its rational force. For discussion of the normative relevance of compartmentalized belief, see Siegel (b), and for discussion of normative relevance of inattentive experiences, see Siegel and Silins (). …”

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confidence: 99%