How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?

Siegel, Susanna

doi:10.1111/phpr.12273

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…In more recent work (Siegel Forthcoming, in prep.), she argues in further detail for a structural similarity between certain bad forms of inference and certain bad forms of CP, but the view is still highly programmatic, and she doesn't reduce the vagueness and open-ended flexibility of the central notion of similarity enough for us to know whether an elaborated version of the proposal can sort the good cases from the bad, let alone whether it can do so in the right way. This means, of course, that nothing I have argued here can decisively refute her position.…”

Section: Process Inferentialismmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…An alternative – and this is what I want to focus on in this paper – is to develop an internalist view I will call “inferentialism,” which holds that (a) experiences are indeed epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and (b) the familiar canons of proper belief-formation provide the appropriate standards by which experiences are evaluated. Versions of inferentialism have been recently defended by Susanna Siegel (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, Forthcoming, in prep.), Peter Markie (2005, 2006, 2013), and Matthew McGrath (2013a, 2013b). I will argue that all of these inferentialist views are incapable of solving the kinds of problems they set for themselves.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Inferentialism and Cognitive Penetration of Perception

Lyons¹

2016

Episteme

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Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see (hear, taste, etc.) is influenced by such "cognitive" states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that (a) experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has More precisely, the idea is that the contents of perceptual states can be influenced in a particular, more or less direct, top-down way, by the cognitive states of the organism. CP is a 1 controversial empirical thesis (Zeimbekis and Raftopoulos 2015), but I won't be concerned here with whether it is true or not. Instead I will focus on the epistemological implications of the view if it is true, although of course the question is much more interesting if the kinds of CP at issue are empirically plausible.For more details, see .

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Section: Process Inferentialismmentioning

confidence: 98%

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confidence: 99%

Inferentialism and Cognitive Penetration of Perception

Lyons¹

2016

Episteme

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“…A weaker form of internalist foundationalism can be found in works by Siegel (2012Siegel ( , 2013Siegel ( , 2017a. 17 According to Siegel, perceptual experiences can be epistemically downgraded by their etiologies.…”

Section: Weak Internalist Foundationalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception

Ghijsen

2018

Synthese

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Predictive processing accounts of perception (PP) assume that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs rationally influence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism might be reconciled with PP from both an internalist and externalist perspective, and argue that an externalist foundationalism provides the best match with PP.

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“…For Siegel (2011 , 2013 , 2016 , p. 4), ‘cognitive penetrability’ covers all cases of influences on the contents of experience by prior mental states, including cognitive and emotive states, which causally affect the content of perception such that they influence how things look. Thus, cognitive penetrability occurs when the cognitive effects affect not the selection of the input but perceptual processing itself.…”

Section: Early Vision and Cognitive Penetrabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the literature, these cases are unanimously considered not to be cases of cognitively penetrability. It also, much more controversially, excludes any attentional effects from entailing cognitively penetrability because, according to Siegel, they are merely selectional effects that determine the input; the various selection effects where attention selects the input are not cases of cognitively penetrability ( Siegel, 2011 , 2013 , 2016 ). I think that Siegel is wrong to exclude attention as a potential source of cognitively penetrability since attentional selection effects do occur in late vision and render late vision cognitively penetrated but since I do not have the space to discuss this problem I will simply assume that when cognitively driven attention modulates perceptual processing, this process is cognitively penetrable.…”

Section: Early Vision and Cognitive Penetrabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-cueing, the Epistemic Role of Early Vision, and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision

Raftopoulos

2017

Front. Psychol.

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I have argued (Raftopoulos, 2009, 2014) that early vision is not directly affected by cognition since its processes do not draw on cognition as an informational resource; early vision processes do not operate over cognitive contents, which is the essence of the claim that perception is cognitively penetrated; early vision is cognitively impenetrable. Recently it has been argued that there are cognitive effects that affect early vision, such as the various pre-cueing effects guided by cognitively driven attention, which suggests that early vision is cognitively penetrated. In addition, since the signatures of these effects are found in early vision it seems that early vision is directly affected by cognition since its processes seem to use cognitive information. I defend the cognitive impenetrability of early vision in three steps. First, I discuss the problems the cognitively penetrability of perception causes for the epistemic role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs. Second, I argue that whether a set of perceptual processes is cognitively penetrated hinges on whether there are cognitive effects that undermine the justificatory role of these processes in grounding empirical beliefs, and I examine the epistemic role of early vision. I argue, third, that the cognitive effects that act through pre-cueing do not undermine this role and, thus, do not render early vision cognitively penetrable. In addition, they do not entail that early vision uses cognitive information.

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How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?

Cited by 18 publications

References 32 publications

Inferentialism and Cognitive Penetration of Perception

Inferentialism and Cognitive Penetration of Perception

Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception

Pre-cueing, the Epistemic Role of Early Vision, and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision

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