Consciousness and Intentionality

Graham, George; Horgan, Terry; Tienson, John

doi:10.1002/9780470751466.ch38

Cited by 51 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Other determinacy worries for conceptual role theories arise from "Kripkenstein"-style considerations (see Kripke 1982). BonJour (1998, 176-7), Graham et al (2007), Searle (1990), Strawson (2008), and Kriegel (2011b) also raise worries concerning content determinacy for tracking and functional role theories of intentionality. See also Pautz 2013 for critical discussion.…”

Section: Motivating Pitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness and Intentionality

Mendelovici

Bourget

2020

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness

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Philosophers traditionally recognize two key features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the ‘aboutness’ of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or ‘what it’s like’ aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This chapter overviews the key views on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness.

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Section: Motivating Pitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness and Intentionality

Mendelovici

Bourget

2020

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness

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“…The unconscious information may even influence the nature of the phenomenal state associated with the judgment. Graham, Horgan, and Tienson () have argued for non‐sensory propositional phenomenology inseparable from the intentional content of a given propositional attitude state; everyone who has a certain non‐sensory phenomenal state will have a certain intentional content, and everyone with that content will have that state. I oppose this view (Bailey and Richards forth coming).…”

Section: There Is Conscious Object‐seeing Without Attentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identity-Crowding and Object-Seeing: A Reply to Block

Richards

2013

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Contrary to Block's assertion, “identity‐crowding” does not provide an interesting instance of object‐seeing without object‐attention. The successful judgments and unusual phenomenology of identity‐crowding are better explained by unconscious perception and non‐perceptual phenomenology associated with cognitive states. In identity‐crowding, as in other cases of crowding, subjects see jumbled textures and cannot individuate the items contributing to those textures in the absence of attention. Block presents an attenuated sense in which identity‐crowded items are seen, but this is irrelevant to the debate about phenomenal experience of an object in the absence of object‐attention. Finally, even unconscious object perception in identity‐crowding likely involves an attention‐like selective process.

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“…Philosophers of mind have, for many decades, accepted that there is a clear‐cut distinction between intentional properties and phenomenal properties, the former being seen as much more amenable to functional analyses than the latter. While this hard and fast distinction can be challenged (see, e.g., Graham, Horgan, and Tienson 2007), if accepted, the proponent of SCS can, perhaps, concede Clark’s point concerning rather abstract cognitive processes like accounting while nevertheless maintaining that the body makes a special contribution in determining the qualitative nature of our conscious experiences. After all, even some functionalists are attracted to a view according to which conscious properties reside not at the (abstract) level of causal role but at the (embodied) level of physical implementation (see, e.g., Block 1995).…”

Section: Clark’s Critique Of Body‐centrismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition

Dempsey

Shani

2012

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In a recent paper, Andy Clark (2008) has argued that the literature on embodied cognition reveals a tension between two prominent strands within this movement. On the one hand, there are those who endorse what Clark refers to as body‐centrism, a view which emphasizes the special contribution made by the body to a creature’s mental life. Among other things, body centrism implies that significant differences in embodiment translate into significant differences in cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, there are those who endorse what Clark calls extended functionalism, a view which sees the mind as the joint product of the computational resources presented by (i) intracranial processing, (ii) bodily input, and (iii) environmental scaffolding. As such, extended functionalism allows for the possibility that any contribution of the body to cognition and consciousness can be compensated for by the other two contributing factors. While Clark’s sympathies lie with the latter approach, we argue in favour of the former. In particular, we focus on consciousness and argue that the unique contribution the body makes to a creature’s manifold of phenomenal experience cannot be compensated for, in the manner, and on the scale, that Clark envisages.

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Consciousness and Intentionality

Cited by 51 publications

References 23 publications

Consciousness and Intentionality

Consciousness and Intentionality

Identity-Crowding and Object-Seeing: A Reply to Block

Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition

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