Consciousness and Intentionality

Mendelovici, Angela; Bourget, David

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.26

Cited by 25 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…4 4 This claim is very much in line with representationalist treatments of phenomenal consciousness (see, e.g., Harman, 1990 and Dretske, 1995) and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality (see, e.g., Horgan & Tienson, 2002; Kriegel, 2011; Mendelovici, 2018; Mendelovici & Bourget, 2021). …”

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confidence: 62%

Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious consciousness, and phenomenal intentionality

Mendelovici

2021

European J of Philosophy

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In Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value, Uriah Kriegel argues that Brentano's work forms a "live philosophical program" (p. 14, italics omitted) that contemporary philosophy has much to learn from and that is promising and largely correct. To this end, Kriegel argues that Brentano's notion of consciousness is the contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano's rejection of unconscious mentality is a grave mistake that can be fairly neatly excised from his overall view, and that Brentano's notion of intentionality is the contemporary notion of phenomenal intentionality. This paper raises some doubts about these claims, suggesting that Brentano's notion of consciousness might more closely align with the contemporary notion of transitive consciousness than with that of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano's rejection of unconscious mentality cannot be so easily excised from his overall view but that it is not such a grave mistake, and that Brentano's notion of intentionality may not be that of phenomenal intentionality but rather that of generic abountness. I wrap up by considering the extent to which we

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confidence: 62%

Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious consciousness, and phenomenal intentionality

Mendelovici

2021

European J of Philosophy

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“…Naturalizing intentionality in terms of tracking or functional roles is one of the most important goals in philosophy of mind ( 9 ). ‘Naturalization’ and ‘naturalism’ are frequently conflated with ‘reduction’ and ‘reductive physicalism’.…”

Section: The Naturalistic Theory Of Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects ( 8 ). We will say that intentional states (intentionally) represent their intentional contents ( 9 ). In saying that the mind is intentional, phenomenologists imply that the mind is relational.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling intentionality in the human brain

Giotakos¹

2023

Front. Psychiatry

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This paper is focusing on a rather neglected issue that concerns both aspects of philosophy and neurobiology in relation to the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is concerned with the ‘directedness’ or ‘aboutness’ of mental phenomena towards an object. Despite the fact that in philosophy both concepts of aboutness and directedness are conceptually identical with intentionality, a careful neuroscientific approach can demonstrate that these two phenomena represent two distinct conceptual and neurobiological aspects of intentionality with complementary functions. We described the interaction between a series of intentionality and pathogenetic psychobiological factors, the corresponding brain topography, and the resulting clinical manifestation and psychopathology. A permanent failure of intentionality dominates in psychosis, which includes an inappropriateness of the intentional object or connection, from the outset, or even from the prodromal phase of the disorder. Affective disorders may result from imprecise interoceptive prediction error signals, due to a confused identification of the intentional object. In suicidal patients there is an emotional intentionality failure, characterized by an absence of intentional object or a loss of conscious access to normal intentional objects. We may model an ‘intentional system’ as a higher order system, with a monitoring and regulatory role attributed to the brain and behavior. Also, we may consider mental disorders as the result of a radical disruption of intentionality, due to an inappropriateness or lack of the intentional object or due to an inappropriate connection in some points of the suggested brain pathways of intentionality.

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“…This phenomenal consciousness is related to the intentionality or consciousness that is an integral part of human existence. Human beings, as phenomenologists would argue, are not only affected by things or surroundings, but we are also conscious of the thing and surroundings (Mendelovici and Bourget, 2022). Thereby, in the phenomenal consciousness of sense of control, power does not only affect us by offering a conducive space for human flourishing; rather we are also aware that we as humans, with our creative and imaginative power controlling the natural world, are the masters.…”

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Coemergent eco-consciousness and self-consciousness

Paul

2024

Environmental Values

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The metaphysical grounding of the human-environmental relationship has two distinct traditions: metaphysics of mastery and metaphysics of ecosophy. The first one describes the way our human will of flourishing considers the natural world as a realm that in principle is susceptible to being controlled. The natural realm in this conception is considered as resource to be used (Bannon, 2014). On the contrary, the metaphysics of ecosophy, promoted by Arne Naess, proposes a philosophical tradition that argues for a harmony between human and the environment, promoting an alternative idea of human flourishing that is in tune with flourishing of nature. The metaphysics of ecosophy reiterates the primordial of 'we', where 'we' constitute the 'I' (Daly, 2023). These two metaphysical traditions highlight two kinds of phenomenal consciousness. A feeling of power and supremacy, a sense of control, are attached to the metaphysics of mastery. This phenomenal consciousness is related to the intentionality or consciousness that is an integral part of human existence. Human beings, as phenomenologists would argue, are not only affected by things or surroundings, but we are also conscious of the thing and surroundings (Mendelovici and Bourget, 2022). Thereby, in the phenomenal consciousness of sense of control, power does not only affect us by offering a conducive space for human flourishing; rather we are also aware that we as humans, with our creative and imaginative power controlling the natural world, are the masters. This intentionality is so strong and embedded in our existence that it is part of our self-consciousness. Similarly, phenomenal consciousness that arises from the metaphysics of ecosophy offers a feeling of the sublime, surrender and a sense of uncertainty. This eventually makes us aware that we are merely a member of the earth and of our reality of co-existence. This phenomenal consciousness makes us actors. Our actions (labour/ work) become part of our self-consciousness. This volume of Environmental Values juxtaposes these two metaphysical traditions and traces the transition in the human-environment relationship in varied contexts that happened in the past or is going to happen. Readers may easily read this volume with an objective of locating the relationship between metaphysics and ethics of human-environment relationship. However, I would suggest, this volume will add more value to the scholarship of environmental ethics if readers explore the nuances of phenomenological ethics by locating the co-emergence between self-consciousness and eco-consciousness and its significance in valuing the environment.The first entry of this volume by Şerban is Slow ecology: Local knowledge and natural restoration on the lower Danube. This article showcases an epistemological divergence between top-down restoration projects in the Danube flood plain of Belene, dominated by

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Consciousness and Intentionality

Cited by 25 publications

References 46 publications

Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious consciousness, and phenomenal intentionality

Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious consciousness, and phenomenal intentionality

Modeling intentionality in the human brain

Coemergent eco-consciousness and self-consciousness

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