Conscious Vision in Action

Briscoe, Robert; Schwenkler, John

doi:10.1111/cogs.12226

Cited by 36 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 88 publications

(152 reference statements)

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“…It is tempting to suggest that extrapolation to the present occurs in the ventral stream and extrapolation to the future anticipated moment of interception occurs in the dorsal stream. However, it is not clear that the two streams are completely independent, nor is it certain that conscious (visual) percepts are confined to the ventral stream (Briscoe & Schwenkler, 2015;. Therefore I shall say only Extrapolation to the present 18 that extrapolation to the present can be distinguished from extrapolation to the future anticipated moment of interception.…”

Section: Review Part 1: Gaze Directionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the perceived present a predictive model of the objective present?

White

2018

Visual Cognition

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Processing latencies for coherent, high level percepts in vision are at least 100 ms and possibly as much as 500 ms. Processing latencies are less in other modalities, but still significant. This seems to imply that perception lags behind reality by an amount equal to the processing latency. It has been proposed that the brain can compensate for perceptual processing latencies by using the most recent available information to extrapolate forward, thereby constructing a model of what the world beyond the senses is like now. The present paper reviews several lines of evidence relating to this hypothesis, including the flash-lag effect, motion-induced position shifts, representational momentum, static visual illusions, and motion extrapolation at the retina. There are alternative explanations for most of the results but there are some findings for which no competing explanation has yet been proposed. Collectively, the evidence for extrapolation to the present is suggestive but not yet conclusive. An alternative account of compensation for processing latencies, based on the hypothesis of rapid emergence of percepts, is proposed. Keywords: perceived present moment; extrapolation to the present; predictive coding; flashlag effect; perceptual processing latencies. Word count: Main text: 16,921 Extrapolation to the present 3 Is the perceived present a predictive model of the objective present? All of us have the feeling that we live in the present moment; that is, in terms of perception, that we perceive the world outside our brains as it is now. I shall hereafter use the term "perceived present" to refer to the collective set of perceptual information that seems to us to represent the outside world as it is now. In fact, operation of peripheral sensors, neural transduction and perceptual processing of input information take time, so it can be argued that our conscious percepts are out of date by an amount equal to the combined latency of those things (hereafter just "processing latency", for convenience). 1 That is, we are in effect perceiving a moment that is in the past by however long it takes for perceptual processing to generate the percept of that moment. An alternative possibility is that the brain uses the processed information, not to represent the recent past, but to predict the present moment. In that case, conscious percepts would be the contents of the predictive model of the present moment, generated from the most recent available information. The aim of this paper is to review the evidence concerning that possibility. I shall start by briefly describing the processing latency problem, and I shall then proceed to a review of several lines of research that have been taken as evidence for the predictive model hypothesis, which I shall call the extrapolation to the present hypothesis. At the end I shall propose an alternative account, based on the hypothesis that conscious percepts begin to emerge no more than 100-150 ms after stimulus onset (ASO). Several kinds of adjustment to the temporal location of thing...

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Section: Review Part 1: Gaze Directionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the perceived present a predictive model of the objective present?

White

2018

Visual Cognition

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“…In addition, the extent to which visually guided action is cognitively penetrable and the ways in which it may be influenced by semantic information are matters of intense current debate (Briscoe & Schwenkler, ; Brogaard, ; Caiani & Ferretti, ; Kozuch, ; Mahon & Wu, ; Nanay, ; Shepherd, ; Wu, ). As pointed out by Mahon and Wu (, p. 211), there are “three places that semantic information can influence dorsal stream computations: (a) at the level of input to the dorsal stream; (b) at the level of output from the dorsal stream; and (c) at the level of internal computations within the dorsal stream.” On their view, only the third kind of influence would count as cognitive penetration.…”

Section: Motor Representations Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Mylopoulos

Pacherie

2018

WIRES Cognitive Science

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Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Motor Skill and Performance Philosophy > Action.

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“…Furthermore, although the dorsal stream is functionally specialized for enabling fine grained visuo-motor transformations and for enabling very rapid on-line motor corrections, the data suggests that conscious vision and processing in the ventral stream is required for normal action guidance (see Shepherd 2015; Zipoli Caiani and Ferretti 2017), as well as for actions in a wide range of contexts-e.g., slightly slower visually guided actions, unfamiliar actions, and so on. I cannot review all of the evidence here, but Briscoe and Schwenkler (2015) have done so, convincingly concluding that 'there is no general, empirically based objection to the notion that consciously encoded information is used to control bodily actions' (1460).…”

Section: Object Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Intelligent action guidance and the use of mixed representational formats

Shepherd

2018

Synthese

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My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that [a] cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent guidance of action, [b] these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, [c] the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information (often conceptually structured information) specialized for action guidance, which in turn suggests that [d] the cognitive processes of practical reasoning that play a key role in the guidance of intelligent action are not the abstract, syllogistic ones philosophers often treat as the paradigm of practical reasoning. Rather, these cognitive processes are constrained by, and work well with, the specialized concepts outputted by perception and the feedback outputted by sensorimotor processes.

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Conscious Vision in Action

Cited by 36 publications

References 88 publications

Is the perceived present a predictive model of the objective present?

Is the perceived present a predictive model of the objective present?

Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Intelligent action guidance and the use of mixed representational formats

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