Conjuring the Holographic State

Abstract

No current policy paradigm, however interdisciplinary, provides an adequate and coherent account of post-9/11 security doctrine for "a war with no clear end or scope." Like the hologram, the image of the terrorist constructed by PATRIOT and kindred legislation appears vivid while defying a definitive grasp, just as the holographic image dematerializes on the hand reaching to touch it. This article sketches etiology for a new policy analytic paradigm that is coined here, the Holographic State, and explores its suitability for policy and administrative sense making under conditions where the epistemological and ontological foundations of policy inquiry have been made profoundly unstable.We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. It is therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination.

Foucauldian Power and Schmittian Politics

“…The risk of terrorist events was perceived to have reached such a high probability that the state had to build an extensive security apparatus to prevent such attacks. Presidential leadership coupled with administrative action enabled the United States to become released from international, domestic, and internal constraints (Baker, 2003; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005; Newswander, 2011; Witt & deHaven-Smith, 2008). The Bush administration enacted a new policy that classified terrorists as enemy combatants and citizens as an extension of the state apparatus as they were to monitor suspected activities (Lyon, 2003).…”

The Emergence of Partisans and Terrorists

“…However, scholars often fail to examine how these managerial processes, which privilege flexibility, are also grounded in historical, theoretical, and political issues that have implications for how administrators order spaces. A deeper understanding of these processes is necessary to appreciate the ramifications of administrative action (Catlaw, 2005(Catlaw, , 2007Witt & deHaven-Smith, 2008). This change in administration is partially a result of a long-term process reflecting the changing status and capacity of enemies of the state.…”