Confronting the Impact of Citizens United

Levitt, Justin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1676108

Cited by 25 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Our key limitation is that, first, although lobbying is one of the important political tactics used by firms in the USA and dominates political spending by corporations (De Figueiredo and Richter, 2014;Levitt, 2015;Wood, 1985), other tactics do exist including contributions to PACs and coalition building with other interest groups such as non-governmental organizations and the media (Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004). Due to our data limitations, we are not able to account for the variety of tactics used in CPAs by MNEs.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another tentative explanation for this finding could be that, in the USA, CPA mechanisms other than lobbying, e.g. PAC contributions, were legitimized only recently (Levitt, ). Thus, within the timeframe of our panel data, lobbying has remained the dominant mechanism of CPA for foreign firms in the USA, reducing the scope to use alternative mechanisms.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Home‐institutional Imprinting and Lobbying Expenditure of Foreign Firms: Moderating Effects of Experience and Technological Intensity

Shirodkar

Konara

McGuire

2017

British J of Management

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The issue of whether a firm's ‘home’ environment influences its non‐market activities in a ‘host’ country is being increasingly discussed in the international business literature. In this paper, we use institutional and organizational imprinting theories to argue that multinational enterprises (MNEs) founded in countries with stronger regulatory institutions are likely to spend more on lobbying in a host country compared to MNEs founded in countries with weaker regulatory institutions. We also argue that this effect is moderated by the MNE's overall experience, its experience within the host country and its technological intensity. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 378 foreign MNEs (among the largest 500) operating in the USA, spanning the eight year period 2006−2013, and representing 29 home countries. Our results support our hypothesis on the relationship between home‐institutional imprinting and overseas lobbying expenditure, as described above. Our results also support our arguments that MNEs’ overall experience and technological intensity reduce the imprinting effect of home institutions on lobbying expenditure; however, our moderating effect of host‐country experience on this relationship is not supported.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Home‐institutional Imprinting and Lobbying Expenditure of Foreign Firms: Moderating Effects of Experience and Technological Intensity

Shirodkar

Konara

McGuire

2017

British J of Management

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“…One possibility is that satisfying the wishes of large donors is corruptive, whereas satisfying the wishes of constituents is not. Levitt (2010) observed that when a corporation secures favorable legislation as a reward for election expenditures, that outcome is viewed as pernicious when the legislation is harmful to the voting constituency but is viewed as unremarkable when the legislation benefits the voting constituency. Yet as Rosenblum (2008) argues, advocates of reform often evince a generalized "anxiety of influence," which treats as suspect any kind of political influence and views the influence of political parties as particularly sinister.…”

Section: The Problem Of Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Campaign Finance and American Democracy

Dawood

2015

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

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This article considers the vast academic literature on campaign finance regulation in the United States, drawing on the fields of political theory, American politics, election law, constitutional law, and economics. The scholarly treatment of campaign finance regulation has become increasingly focused on fundamental questions about democratic governance and democratic values, and it has generated profound debates about participation, representation, free speech, political equality, liberty, and the organization and distribution of political power in government and society. This article reviews the original debate about campaign finance regulation and traces its evolution in both political theory and constitutional law, identifying current areas of inquiry and new directions in research. In particular, the article focuses on corruption, political equality and representation, electoral exceptionalism, and the post-Citizens United landscape. It also surveys empirical findings from political science and economics. 25.1

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“…Justin Levitt models disclosure of outside influence on a ''Nutrition Facts label for democracy,'' what he calls a ''Democracy Facts'' disclaimer. 159 It emphasizes ''simple proxies for the quantity and fervor of local support for a particular communication,'' including the number of contributors within the district and the percentage of large contributors, to ''help flag the existence of a false bandwagon.'' 160 Levitt's goal is modest: ''help to mitigate informational miscues provoked by particular frequently repeated communications.''…”

Section: Campaigningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Outside Influence

Johnstone¹

2014

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy

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This article considers how much outside influence matters to the constitutional analysis of state politics. It defends the political community principle applied in Bluman v. Federal Election Comm'n as an exception to the otherwise universal speaker-neutrality rule of Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n. It draws parallels between efforts to police national and state boundaries in politics, and the competing rights claims of outsiders to cross those boundaries and participate fully in domestic politics. The article suggests that the structural constitutional principle of political community supports certain state regulations of outside influence across a range of political activities. Part I reviews the structural and historical basis for the constitutional concern about outside influence. Part II considers the gnarled doctrinal roots of Bluman, and how they might help support state, as well as national, safeguards against outside influence. Part III proposes an important state interest in regulating, but not excluding, outside influence in state and local politics, and suggests some applications of the principle to outside influence in several spheres of political activity.

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Confronting the Impact of Citizens United

Cited by 25 publications

References 4 publications

Home‐institutional Imprinting and Lobbying Expenditure of Foreign Firms: Moderating Effects of Experience and Technological Intensity

Home‐institutional Imprinting and Lobbying Expenditure of Foreign Firms: Moderating Effects of Experience and Technological Intensity

Campaign Finance and American Democracy

Outside Influence

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