Conformity and reciprocity in public good provision

Bardsley, Nicholas; Sausgruber, Rupert

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2005.02.001

Cited by 157 publications

(120 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Finally, we examine the propensity to C with two individual differences questionnaires which might reveal participant characteristics relevant to cooperative behavior or the desire to maximize profits. Some researchers have reported links between strategic 'giving' and Reward Responsiveness in Public Good Games and variants (Scheres & Sanfey, 2006;Skatova & Ferguson, in press) and others that cooperative behavior is enhanced by reciprocation (Bardsley & Sausgruber, 2005). An interesting aspect of the current task is that cooperative behavior carries no financial reward (e.g., through reciprocation).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Pothos¹,

Perry²,

Corr³

et al. 2011

Personality and Individual Differences

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. In the standard one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game, participants often choose to cooperate, when the optimal strategy is to defect. This puzzling finding has attracted considerable interest both in terms of possible computational frameworks for modeling human judgment, but also regarding the more general debate of human altruism. In this research, we ask how much of human behavior in this task can be explained by a putative bias for cooperative behavior and whether this, in turn, is influenced by personality. We compared performance on the standard task with performance on a matched neutral one; we manipulated the optimal strategy (defect or cooperate); and we manipulated the amount of payoff for responding optimally. Results revealed little evidence for a bias for cooperative behavior, but significant associations with the personality factors of Behavioural Activation System (BAS) Reward Responsivity and Agreeableness were found. These findings are discussed in terms of the attempt to explain judgment in one-shot, Prisoner's Dilemma tasks with statistical or probabilistic models. Permanent repository link

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Pothos¹,

Perry²,

Corr³

et al. 2011

Personality and Individual Differences

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“…However, reciprocity needs a positive incentive. For instance, Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) find that a reciprocally motivated agent will contribute to a public good only if he or she receives a benefit from it.…”

Section: Sociological Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, an individual farmer is expected to be more willing to comply with a regulation if many farmers respect it (Fehr and Falk, 2002) or, similarly, a farmer has a motivation to fulfil social norms or expectations of the farmer's peer group (Henrich, 2004). Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) describe conformity as an incentive to adjust own behaviour according to "social comparisons" even without material consequences. 14 Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) show that people in ultimatum game experiments do not react to information about randomly chosen offers but revise their action if faced with average offers.…”

Section: Sociological Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Why do farmers behave as they do? Understanding compliance with rural, agricultural, and food attribute standards

Herzfeld

Jongeneel

2012

Land Use Policy

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“…Previous empirical research has shown the influence of information on pro-social behavior, even when the information is payoff irrelevant (see, e.g. Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2005;Bicchieri and Xiao, 2008;Bicchieri and Chavez, 2009;Cason and Mui, 1998;Frey and Meier, 2004;Krupka and Weber, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Words or deeds? Choosing what to know about others

Xiao

Bicchieri

2011

Synthese

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Social cooperation often relies on individuals' spontaneous norm obedience when there is no punishment for violation or reward for compliance. However, people do not consistently follow pro-social norms. Previous studies have suggested that an individual's tendency toward norm conformity is affected by empirical information (i.e. what others did or would do in a similar situation) as well as by normative information (i.e. what others think one ought to do). Yet little is known about whether people have an intrinsic desire to obtain norm-revealing information. In this paper, we use a dictator game to investigate whether dictators actively seek norm-revealing information and, if so, whether they prefer to get empirical or normative information. Our data show that although the majority of dictators choose to view free information before making decisions, they are equally likely to choose empirical or normative information. However, a large majority (more than 80%) of dictators are not willing to incur even a very small cost for getting information. Our findings help to understand why norm compliance is context-dependent, and highlight the importance of making norm-revealing information salient in order to promote conformity. . Acknowledgement:We gratefully acknowledge the Goldstone Research Unit for funding that supported this research. We received valuable comments from Daniel Houser, Roberto Weber as well as attendees of the 2008 Economic Science Association meetings.

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Conformity and reciprocity in public good provision

Cited by 157 publications

References 37 publications

Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Why do farmers behave as they do? Understanding compliance with rural, agricultural, and food attribute standards

Words or deeds? Choosing what to know about others

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