Conflict Management and Outcomes in Franchise Relationships: The Role of Regulation

The Dark Side of Interorganizational Relationships: An Integrative Review and Research Agenda

“…Multiple dimensions Disagreements (conflict) between manufacturer and dealer across more than 20 issues (Lusch, 1976: 384), emotional conflict & task conflict (J. Li & Hambrick, 2005: 803), latent conflict, manifest conflict & conflict resolution (Frazier & Rody, 1991: 66), task conflict & relationship conflict (Mo, Booth, & Wang 2012: 124), structural conflict & operating conflict (Molnar & Rogers, 1979: 408-409) Conflict & hostility (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995: 354), conflict & prudence (Habib, 1987: 816), perceived conflict captured using 23 bipolar adjectives (Stern, Sternthal, & Craig, 1973: 175) Single dimension Buyer-supplier conflict (Bai, Sheng, & Li, 2016: 22), conflict (Luo, Liu, & Xue, 2009: 1133Steensma, Barden, Dhanaraj, Lyles, & Tihanyi, 2008;Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998: 148;Wilcox & Smith, 1977: 95), conflict tie (Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2014), experienced parent conflict (Barden, Steensma, & Lyles, 2005: 163), intrachannel conflict (Schul, Pride, & Little, 1983: 25), litigation (Michael, 2000), litigated conflict (Antia, Zheng, & Frazier, 2013) Exporter's opportunism (Skarmeas, Katsikeas, & Schlegelmilch, 2002: 781), opportunism (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006: 1076Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999: 168;John, 1984: 288;Lado, Dant, & Tekleab, 2008: 423;Luo, 2007: 49), partner opportunism (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005: 114), supplier opportunism (Morgan, Kaleka, & Gooner, 2007: 519), supplier opportunism (M. Wang, Zhang, Wang, & Sheng, 2016: 88), supplier opportunism (Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 2003), perception of opportunistic behavior (Parkhe, 1993: 828) Ex post opportunism (D. T...…”

“…For instance, Bai, Sheng, and Li (2016) find that output-based contracts reduce buyersupplier conflict, while behavior-based contracts increase buyer-supplier conflict. The content of the contract (Heide et al, 2007;Zhou & Xu, 2012), governance regime (Antia et al, 2013;Carson et al, 2006), and partnering and organizational modes (Carter, 2000;John, 1984;Molnar & Rogers, 1979) delineate expectations and obligations between parties. Prior research on formal aspects largely concerns the role of control characteristics, such as narrow versus broad (Groot & Merchant, 2000), coercive versus noncohesive (Lusch, 1976), and bilateral versus quasi-hierarchical structure (Zhou & Xu, 2012), in the emergence of conflict and opportunism.…”

“…Like the research on antecedents, studies on ex ante moderators primarily focus on IORlevel factors. For example, the extent to which franchise regulations ratchet conflict up or down depends on the extent to which franchisors rely on franchisee-owned units (Antia et al, 2013). Other formal moderators include governance structure (Boyle et al, 1992;Kivleniece & Quélin, 2012), shared control versus split control (Hambrick, Li, Xin, & Tsui, 2001), and franchising type (Barthélemy, 2008).…”

The Effect of Review Writing on Learning Engagement in Channel Partner Relationship Management

“…Second, exclusivity in a channel relationship determines the power that the channel parties can exert, their motivations to work, and the channel's structures and performance (Antia, Zheng, and Frazier 2013;Gilliland and Kim 2014;Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007).…”

Agency Costs and Scarce Resources: Influences on Brazilian Franchising

“…In addition to ex post concerns related to ensuring that the local agent delivers the promised level of effort (a moral hazard issue), franchising reduces ex ante expenditures with both search and selection of these agents (Antia, Zheng, & Frazier, 2013). Adverse selection problems can be aggravated if the partner selection process occurs in places with great physical or cultural distance from the firm's HQ.…”