Conflict Aggravation or Alleviation? A Cross-National Examination of U.S. Military Aid’s Effect on Conflict Dynamics with Insights from Pakistan

Abstract

MILITARY AID RELATIONSHIPS ALLOW DONORS to avoid direct intervention and delegate the practical execution of their security goals to recipients. But recipients often fall short of meeting the security objectives that underpin military aid. Pakistan, which has received large amounts of military aid from the United States since September 11, 2001, has been consistently criticized by U.S. administrations for failing to do enough to dismantle terrorist networks. In 2018, the Donald Trump administration finally announced its decision to halt all security aid to Pakistan for playing a duplicitous role and providing sanctuaries to terrorists. 1 The case of Pakistan presents an intriguing puzzle about the broader effects of external security aid. While Pakistan indeed has not done

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“…Despite the apparent cost‐effectiveness of military aid for the sender, scholars argue that military assistance can be potentially destabilizing for the recipient. Jadoon (2020, p. 676) demonstrates that increased U.S. military assistance to Pakistan contributed to a destabilizing cycle within the country. As the Pakistani military increased the tempo of its operations, in weakly governed regions of the country, violence worsened existing governance and public goods provision challenges, producing conditions ideal for terrorist recruitment (Jadoon, 2020, p. 678).…”

“…Jadoon (2020, p. 676) demonstrates that increased U.S. military assistance to Pakistan contributed to a destabilizing cycle within the country. As the Pakistani military increased the tempo of its operations, in weakly governed regions of the country, violence worsened existing governance and public goods provision challenges, producing conditions ideal for terrorist recruitment (Jadoon, 2020, p. 678). Furthermore, Bapat (2011) suggests that military aid distorts partner state incentives by creating a misalignment between partner self‐interest and U.S. interests.…”

“…Pakistan has been a major recipient of American military aid since 9/11. U.S. military aid has primarily consisted of financial reimbursements to the Pakistani military for its support of coalition operations, as well as the development of Pakistan's own counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities (Jadoon, 2020, p. 671). However, Pakistani officials' support for select militant organizations in the region, especially the Afghan Taliban, has created a growing rift between the two countries.…”

“…Although Pakistan viewed its support for militants within the context of ensuring strategic depth vis‐à‐vis India, the United States saw Pakistan's secretive relationship with the Afghan Taliban as a threat to the U.S. mission there (Mazari, 2002, p. 6). Pakistan's willingness to covertly support the Afghan Taliban, especially in the form of providing safe havens and refuge was cited as one of the key factors in President Trump's 2018 decision to halt military aid to the country (Jadoon, 2020, p. 665). Regardless of Islamabad's paradoxical relationship with regional militants, Pakistan has paid a remarkably high price for its involvement in the GWoT: between 2001 and 2017, over 16,773 Pakistanis were killed in terrorist attacks (Jadoon, 2020, p. 666).…”

“…Pakistan's willingness to covertly support the Afghan Taliban, especially in the form of providing safe havens and refuge was cited as one of the key factors in President Trump's 2018 decision to halt military aid to the country (Jadoon, 2020, p. 665). Regardless of Islamabad's paradoxical relationship with regional militants, Pakistan has paid a remarkably high price for its involvement in the GWoT: between 2001 and 2017, over 16,773 Pakistanis were killed in terrorist attacks (Jadoon, 2020, p. 666). As one of America's most significant (and most controversial) partners in the GWoT, any study of American foreign aid in the post‐9/11 era would be incomplete without consideration of the U.S.al‐Qaeda Pakistani relationship.…”