Condorcet Winners and Social Acceptability

Mahajne, Muhammad; Volij, Oscar

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3232784

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The proof of statement 1 results from Theorem 1 in Mahajne and Volij (2018b). However, we present a similar proof with some changes, for the use of statement 2.…”

Section: Proof Of Lemmamentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Now, by the definition of Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein, and since is a (weak) Condorcet winner, it must be that ∈ ℂ, because if ∉ ℂ, then any ∈ ℂ will not satisfy the requirement: ( ( ≻ ′ )) > ( ( ′ ≻ )), ∀ ′ ∈ \{ )}, just if we take ′ = . By Lemma 1 in Mahajne and Volij (2018b), must be socially acceptable. The next example completes the proof and shows that a Condorcet committee can be socially acceptable and can be partly unacceptable with respect to single-crossing profile.…”

Section: Condorcet Committees Under Single-crossing Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

Diss¹,

Mahajne

2020

Mathematical Social Sciences

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We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable. We focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every nonmember by a majority, and we show that a Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or singlecaved and the committee size is not "too large" then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.. AbstractWe define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable.We focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every non-member by a majority, and we show that a Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or single-caved and the committee size is not "too large" then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.

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“…The proof of statement 1 results from Theorem 1 in Mahajne and Volij (2018b). However, we present a similar proof with some changes, for the use of statement 2.…”

Section: Proof Of Lemmamentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Condorcet Committees Under Single-crossing Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

Diss¹,

Mahajne

2020

Mathematical Social Sciences

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“…Also, q-majority decisiveness proposed byBaharad and Nitzan (2002) is a particular case of k = 1. A somewhat similar approach but for q-Condorcet consistency is developed byBaharad and Nitzan (2003),Courtin et al (2015), andMahajne and Volij (2018). All these approaches are based on worst-case analysis.…”

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confidence: 99%

Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

Kondratev

Nesterov

2019

Public Choice

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We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of their most preferred candidates is the measure of majority power, and the minimal share of voters that allows them to veto each of their least preferred candidates is the measure of veto power. We find tight bounds on these minimal shares for voting rules that are popular in the literature and in real elections. We order these rules according to majority power and veto power. The instant-runoff voting has both the highest majority power and the highest veto power and the plurality rule has the lowest. In general, the higher the majority power of a voting rule is, the higher its veto power. The three exceptions are: voting with proportional veto power, Black's rule, and Borda rule, which have a relatively low level of majority power and a high level of veto power and thus provide minority protection. Our results can shed light on how voting rules provide different incentives for voter participation and candidate nomination.

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Condorcet Winners and Social Acceptability

Cited by 2 publications

References 10 publications

Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

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