Conditions and Analyses of Knowing

Shope, Robert K.

doi:10.1093/0195130057.003.0002

Cited by 23 publications

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“…Others who deny that propositional knowledge entails belief include Woozley ; Williams ; Black ; Margolis ; Annis ; Ring ; Harker ; Lewis ; Shope ; Schwitzgebel . Williamson argues that belief is not conceptually prior to knowledge but nonetheless asserts that knowledge entails belief.…”

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confidence: 99%

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Myers-Schulz

Schwitzgebel

2013

Nous

110

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Abstract:Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without -or at least without determinately -believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical.

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confidence: 99%

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Myers-Schulz

Schwitzgebel

2013

Nous

110

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“…9 Although it is too large an issue to consider here, the type of virtue theory that Greco seeks to improve is in trouble from the start if knowing does not always require belief, or even truth (cf. Shope 1983Shope , 2002. 10 Greco also phrases the condition as follows:…”

Section: Appealing To Considerations About 'The Cause' and Saliencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The analysis of representing mentioned in footnote 20 alludes to causal selection, and makes representing contextually relative to the justified status of various presupposed propositions, where the justified status of a proposition concerns, roughly, the way in which the cognitive powers and virtues of members of an epistemic community would be manifested in accepting the proposition (Shope 1983(Shope , 2002(Shope , 2004. A shift in context can make a difference concerning whether knowledge is present by changing which propositions are presupposed as justified.…”

Section: Differing Yet Compatible Knowledge Attributions Concerning Nmentioning

confidence: 99%

Abnormality, cognitive virtues, and knowledge

Shope¹

2008

Synthese

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Causal analyses of one's knowing that p have recently emphasized the involvement of cognitive virtues in coming to believe that p. John Greco suggests that in order to deal with Gettier-type cases, a virtue analysis of knowing should include a requirement that one's knowing does not in a certain way involve abnormality. Yet Greco's emphasis on statistical abnormality either renders his analysis subject to a generality problem or to objections regarding certain Gettier-type cases. When we instead consider abnormality in the sense of a causally differentiating factor in relation to a causal contrast situation, the account remains unclear concerning its application to an interesting non-Gettier-type case concerning chance. The exploration of these shortcomings casts doubt on the epistemological usefulness of the schema, 'If you know, then there is no abnormality in your being right.'

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“…Epistemologists have generally taken Gettier's arguments against JTB to be successful, and have been trying, for the five decades since Gettier's paper, to come up with a definition or conception of knowledge that would not be undermined by the Gettier‐challenge (Zagzebski ; Shope , 33; Sosa ; see also Kvanvig , 29). As Zagzebski declares, “The moral drawn in the thirty years since Gettier published his famous paper is that either justified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient for knowledge, in which case knowledge must have an ‘extra’ component in addition to JTB, or else justification must be reconceived to make it sufficient for knowledge” (1994, 65).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth Analysis of the Gettier Argument

Yakubu

2016

Metaphilosophy

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Gettier (1963) presented the now famous Gettier problem as a challenge to epistemology. The methods Gettier used to construct his challenge, however, utilized certain principles of formal logic that are actually inappropriate for the natural language discourse of the Gettier cases. In that challenge to epistemology, Gettier also makes truth claims that would be considered controversial in analytic philosophy of language. The Gettier challenge has escaped scrutiny in these other relevant academic disciplines, however, because of its façade as an epistemological analysis. This article examines Gettier's methods with the analytical tools of logic and analytic philosophy of language.

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Conditions and Analyses of Knowing

Cited by 23 publications

References 0 publications

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Abnormality, cognitive virtues, and knowledge

Truth Analysis of the Gettier Argument

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