Truth Analysis of the Gettier Argument

Abstract

Gettier (1963) presented the now famous Gettier problem as a challenge to epistemology. The methods Gettier used to construct his challenge, however, utilized certain principles of formal logic that are actually inappropriate for the natural language discourse of the Gettier cases. In that challenge to epistemology, Gettier also makes truth claims that would be considered controversial in analytic philosophy of language. The Gettier challenge has escaped scrutiny in these other relevant academic disciplines, however, because of its façade as an epistemological analysis. This article examines Gettier's methods with the analytical tools of logic and analytic philosophy of language.

Definite Descriptions in Argument: Gettier’s Ten-Coins Example

“…If we adhere strictly to Kripke's analysis of referential definite descriptions, the truth claim (i) actually holds, contrary to Yakubu's (2016) suggestion that the truth claim fails under the referential interpretation of (e). Yakubu's conclusion arises from a different consideration.…”

“…reason why Gettier cannot claim to be using the definite description attributively is that the reading of (e), attributively or referentially is determined by context, rather than the prerogative of the author. And the context of this case does not fit the attributive interpretation (Yakubu 2016). As…”

“…Yakubu (2016) critiques the manner of Gettier's application of the rules of classical logic in that second argument.…”