Conditioning and blocking of the McCollough effect

Brand, Jay; Holding, Dennis H.; Jones, Paul D.

doi:10.3758/bf03208232

Cited by 17 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…57,58 Indeed, color-after effects in the visions 59 appear to be subject to blocking. [60][61][62] Taken together, these findings suggest a unified model of perception, action, and belief driven by predictions and PEs.…”

Section: Bayes Predictive Coding and Associationsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Explaining Delusions: Reducing Uncertainty Through Basic and Computational Neuroscience

Feeney

Groman

Taylor

et al. 2017

Schizophrenia Bulletin

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Delusions, the fixed false beliefs characteristic of psychotic illness, have long defied understanding despite their response to pharmacological treatments (e.g., D 2 receptor antagonists). However, it can be challenging to discern what makes beliefs delusional compared with other unusual or erroneous beliefs. We suggest mapping the putative biology to clinical phenomenology with a cognitive psychology of belief, culminating in a teleological approach to beliefs and brain function supported by animal and computational models. We argue that organisms strive to minimize uncertainty about their future states by forming and maintaining a set of beliefs (about the organism and the world) that are robust, but flexible. If uncertainty is generated endogenously, beliefs begin to depart from consensual reality and can manifest into delusions. Central to this scheme is the notion that formal associative learning theory can provide an explanation for the development and persistence of delusions. Beliefs, in animals and humans, may be associations between representations (e.g., of cause and effect) that are formed by minimizing uncertainty via new learning and attentional allocation. Animal research has equipped us with a deep mechanistic basis of these processes, which is now being applied to delusions. This work offers the exciting possibility of completing revolutions of translation, from the bedside to the bench and back again. The more we learn about animal beliefs, the more we may be able to apply to human beliefs and their aberrations, enabling a deeper mechanistic understanding.Key words: delusions/behavioral neuroscience/cognitive neuroscience/computational psychiatry/associative learning The End of the World and the Beginning of a TheoryIn December 1954, the Chicago Tribune reported that Dorothy Martin was relaying a prophecy from extra-terrestrials that the world was about to end. A number of followers flocked to her but her prophecy did not manifest. She ultimately settled in Sedona, Arizona where she lived until she was 92, continuing to proselytize about aliens but evading interaction with psychiatric services. Did Martin have delusions? What about her acolytes? Defining, explaining, and ultimately understanding delusions has proven challenging (see Freeman and Bebbington, this issue). In this article, we describe how neuroscientists have tried to meet that challenge. The approach demands some simplifying assumptions. Basic neuroscience in preclinical models will not recapitulate all of the features of delusions. However, simple models can be useful.

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Section: Bayes Predictive Coding and Associationsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Explaining Delusions: Reducing Uncertainty Through Basic and Computational Neuroscience

Feeney

Groman

Taylor

et al. 2017

Schizophrenia Bulletin

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Brand, Holding, and Jones (1987) found diminished AEs following compound inspection, relative to the AEs measured when the compound components were viewed alone, while Westbrook and Harrison (1984) found no decrements. One argument that has been offered to explain such decrements is that the effective conditioning stimulus in the compound condition is the configuration, or gestalt percept, of the stimuli rather than the sum of two individual components (Mackintosh, 1975;St.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overprediction and blocking in the McCollough aftereffect

Sloane

Ost

Etheriedge

et al. 1989

Perception & Psychophysics

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“…It has been shown that more salient elements of a compound "overshadow" (Kamin, 1969) less salient elements during induction, preventing the less salient elements from eliciting CCAEs (e.g., Brand, Holding, & Jones, 1987;Eissenberg et al, 1995;Siegel & Allan, 1985). Eissenberg et al, for example, showed that with high-contrast grids, grid orientation was more salient than frame lightness and that grid orientation overshadowed frame lightness.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Isoluminance and contingent color aftereffects

Allan

Siegel

Kulatunga-Moruzi

et al. 1997

Perception & Psychophysics

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In the typical induction of the orientation-contingent color aftereffect (CCAE), the stimuli are composed of elements that differ in both color and luminance. Three experiments are reported that show that chromatic contrast between stimulus elements is insufficient for the induction of the orientation-CCAE and that luminance contrast is necessary. These experiments expand on previous research concerned with the role of luminance contrast in the induction of orientation-CCAEsby eliminating alternative explanations.The orientation-contingent color aftereffect (CCAE) typically is induced by alternating two complementarily colored and orthogonally oriented grids every few seconds for several minutes (McCollough, 1965). For example, a grid constructed of black-and-green horizontal bars might be alternated with a grid constructed ofblackand-red vertical bars. Following such induction, complementary color aftereffects contingent on grid orientation are noted-black-and-white assessment grids appear colored. In this example, the white space between the black horizontal bars appears pink and the white space between the black vertical bars appears green.The grids used in the induction of the orientation-CCAE are usually composed of chromatic and achromatic (black) bars that differ in luminance. A few studies have examined the role of the luminance contrast' between the chromatic and achromatic bars in the induction ofthe orientation-CCAE. Ellis (1977) and Mikaelian (1980) systematically varied luminance contrast by increasing the luminance of the achromatic bars from black to various shades of gray. They reported that the size of the orientation-CCAE decreased with decreasing luminance contrast and concluded that isoluminant grids were ineffective in inducing an orientation-CCAE. Allan, Siegel, Toppan, and Lockhead (1991) also reported that induction with grids composed of gray and colored isoluminant bars did not result in an orientation-CCAE. These studies are in agreement with Stromeyer's (1978) often-cited conclusion, based on unpublished data, that luminance contrast is necessary for the induction of the orientation-CCAE. ' Although the existing data suggest that luminance contrast is necessary for the induction ofthe orientation-CCAE, an examination of the published experiments reveals that the absence of the orientation-CCAE after isoluminant induction might be attributable to variables other than the luminance contrast of the induction grids. The three experiments reported in the present paper explore this possibility. GENERAL METHOD SubjectsA total of 59 subjects participated in the three experiments. The subjects had no previous experience in contingent aftereffect tasks, and each subject participated in only one of the three experiments. All but 2 of the subjects were students enrolled in introductory psychology at McMastcr University who received course credit for their participation. The remaining 2 subjects (Experiment 2) were 5th year engineering students who volunteered.

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Conditioning and blocking of the McCollough effect

Cited by 17 publications

References 23 publications

Explaining Delusions: Reducing Uncertainty Through Basic and Computational Neuroscience

Explaining Delusions: Reducing Uncertainty Through Basic and Computational Neuroscience

Overprediction and blocking in the McCollough aftereffect

Isoluminance and contingent color aftereffects

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