Conclave

Kwiek, Maksymilian

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.05.004

Cited by 5 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Ponsati and Sakovics (1996) are concerned with properties of equilibria in multiplayer Wars of Attrition with supermajority. Kwiek (2014) is focused on welfare performance of these kind of mechanisms. In contrast to Kwiek (2014), the model below considers setups with private information, all incentive compatible mechanisms, and it looks for efficient mechanisms that take into account the penalty cost.…”

Section: Literature Further Results and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kwiek (2014) is focused on welfare performance of these kind of mechanisms. In contrast to Kwiek (2014), the model below considers setups with private information, all incentive compatible mechanisms, and it looks for efficient mechanisms that take into account the penalty cost. Although Kwiek (2014) and the model below are different, the gist of comparative statics is similar, namely in both models simple majority is inefficient, provided that preference intensities are ex ante heterogeneous enough, or voters' decision has an externality on a wider population.…”

Section: Literature Further Results and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Efficient voting with penalties

Kwiek

2017

Games and Economic Behavior

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Simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters' preferences. This paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism when the choice is binary and the designer may use non-trasferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information. The designer faces a dilemma -a punishment may induce a more correct choice, but its cost is socially wasteful. The efficient mechanism is a weighted majority. Weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments applied if preferences are relatively homogenous. Eliciting types through punishments in order to construct type-specific weights should occur if preference intensity is relatively heterogeneous, or if voters preferences represent a larger population.

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Section: Literature Further Results and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Further Results and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient voting with penalties

Kwiek

2017

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…This paper focuses on a voting mechanism that we call conclave, in which the committee's decision is determined in a form of a waiting game with costly delay. Theoretical work (Kwiek, 2014a;2014b) suggests that voting mechanisms that permit penalties, such as waiting costs, may improve welfare over simple majority.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is beyond the scope of this paper to directly assess whether voting behavior in the experiment is close to equilibrium. 5 Previous theoretical work (Yoon, 2011;Kwiek, 2014aKwiek, , 2014b suggests that, as the distribution of values becomes more ex ante heterogeneous, conclave should perform better in relation to simple majority voting. Intuitively, eciency is obtained if voters with very extreme values have a signicant inuence on which alternative is selected, not the ones that are almost indierent.…”

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confidence: 99%

An experimental study of voting with costly delay

2016

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A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sucient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game is a form of multiplayer war of attrition. Our key nding is that, consistent with theoretical predictions, when voters are ex ante heterogeneous in terms of the intensity of their preferences the conclave leads to eciency gains relative to simple majority voting. We also compare welfare properties of a static versus a dynamic version of a conclave. When social cost of waiting is taken into account, the dynamic conclave is superior in terms of welfare than its static version.JEL classication: C78, C92, D72, D74

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“…The efficiency of mechanisms similar to the ones studied in the present paper was analyzed in Kwiek (2014). The question there was about the effect of the size of supermajority on what we call below allocative efficiency.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 85%

Voting as a war of attrition

Kwiek

Marreiros

Vlassopoulos

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare-the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay.

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Conclave

Cited by 5 publications

References 18 publications

Efficient voting with penalties

Efficient voting with penalties

An experimental study of voting with costly delay

Voting as a war of attrition

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