Efficient voting with penalties

Kwiek, Maksymilian

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.006

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…The considerable variation in the design of voting rules in real-world institutions suggests that rules are-at least to some extent-tailored to different environments. 38 As far as the commonly used linear rules-qualified majority rules and one-sided linear rules-are concerned, their use is consistent with our result that a 37 See also Kwiek (2017). 38 As a case in point, many decision-making bodies use different rules to decide on different issues.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 69%

Linear Voting Rules

Grüner

Tröger²

2019

ECTA

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How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly, and monetary transfers are not feasible? Assuming symmetric independent private values, we show that it is utilitarian‐optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternative‐dependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Any combination of weights and threshold can be optimal. A standard quorum rule can be optimal only when it yields the same outcome as a linear rule. A linear rule is called upper linear if the default is upset at every election result that meets the threshold exactly. We develop a perturbation method to characterize equilibria of voting rules in the case of small participation costs and show that leaving participation voluntary increases welfare for any two‐sided upper linear rule that is optimal under compulsory participation.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 69%

Linear Voting Rules

Grüner

Tröger²

2019

ECTA

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“…Moreover, even if the time preference is asymmetric only ex post, there may be welfare effects of its magnitude. A more detailed discussion of this prospect, along with a possible model formulation, are in Kwiek (2014), Kwiek (2017). In our experiments, the waiting cost is expressed in monetary terms and-to the extent that this monetary payment fully captures time preferences-it is symmetric.…”

Section: Theory: Environment Mechanism and Some Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If any general incentive compatible mechanism could be used, then a vast mechanism-design literature provides a number of results; for example, a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism achieves efficient outcome in dominant strategies, when the welfare criterion is allocative efficiency or when transfers are allowed (Vickrey, 1961;Clarke, 1971;Groves, 1973). Kwiek (2017) studies a general class of voting games without transfers but with penalties, to which our game belongs.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Voting as a war of attrition

Kwiek

Marreiros

Vlassopoulos

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare-the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay.

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Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision

Gersbach,

Tejada

2024

Soc Choice Welf

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We introduce semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision with private valuations. Such rules take the form of a two-stage, multiple-round voting mechanism where the output of the first stage is the default alternative for the second stage and the vote-share thresholds used in every round of binary voting (a) vary with the alternative on the table for a public-good level and (b) require a qualified majority for approving the alternative on the table by stopping the procedure. We show that these mechanisms implement the ex post utilitarian optimal public-good level, provided valuations can only be high or low. This public-good level is chosen after all potential socially optimal alternatives have been picked for a voting round. We explore ways to reduce the number of voting rounds and develop a compound mechanism when there are three or more valuation types.

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Efficient voting with penalties

Cited by 4 publications

References 34 publications

Linear Voting Rules

Linear Voting Rules

Voting as a war of attrition

Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision

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