Conceptualising the policy engagement of interest groups: Involvement, access and prominence

Halpin, Darren; Fraussen, Bert

doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12194

Cited by 79 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…While measures of policy influence are now common in the group literature, to be meaningful they are at the issue level (see Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, ). An aggregate measure of policy success, therefore, would often be something like involvement (the number of times a group engages with a political institution) or access (the number of times a group is granted access to otherwise closed policy venues) or prominence (number of mentions by policy elites) (Binderkrantz et al, ; Halpin & Fraussen, ). Consistent with much work in the interest group field—and the original work of Bouwen ()—we take “access” as our measure of policy benefit.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Does group engagement with members constitute a “beneficial inefficiency”?

Grömping

Halpin

2019

Governance

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This article explores the role of variations in organizational form in explaining levels of group access. Specifically, we test whether group forms incorporating more extensive engagement with members receive policy advantages. We develop and test a account of beneficial inefficiencies. Our account reasons that the costs of inefficient intraorganizational processes and practices associated with enhanced engagement with members are beneficial as they generate crucial “access goods”—specifically encompassing positions—that in turn receive enhanced policy benefits. The costs of intraorganizational practices allowing members to engage more thoroughly in decision making are thus beneficial inefficiencies. We test this proposition using data on the Australian interest group system. Using the tools of cluster analysis, we identify three forms, each varying in respect of the inefficiencies they embody. Our multivariate analysis finds strong support for the account of beneficial inefficiencies: groups with the most inefficient organizational model receiving the greatest policy access.

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Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Does group engagement with members constitute a “beneficial inefficiency”?

Grömping

Halpin

2019

Governance

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“…As Binderkrantz, Pedersen, and Beyers (2016) stress, access is multidimensional, so it has to be evaluated with respect to the specific political arena(s) an actor enters. The theory and empirical testing in this article covers access to both the parliamentary and media arenas, as important forms of inside and outside access, where interest groups enjoy exclusive contact with relevant gatekeepers (Binderkrantz, Pedersen, et al, 2016;Halpin & Fraussen, 2017) and receive the opportunity to transmit constituency information. The article adds to important existing work across arenas, (Beyers, 2004;Binderkrantz et al, 2015;Boehmke, Gailmard, & Patty, 2013;Halpin, Baxter, & MacLeod, 2012) by testing a venue-specific theory on how cooperation in umbrella organizations affects access.…”

Section: Theory: the Value Of Umbrella Structures In Policy Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representation beyond people: Lobbying access of umbrella associations to legislatures and the media

Junk

2018

Governance

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Lobbying access to policy discussions determines how political interests are voiced and potentially exert influence. This article addresses whether access to the national legislature and the media favors umbrella organizations, which represent interests of their member groups. It theorizes that the role of umbrellas goes beyond signaling a large individual membership or constituency of people, but that umbrellas are distinct in transmitting interests from other organizations. This function is expected to be valuable in exchanges with legislators who seek efficiency, input legitimacy, and policy implementation, but less valuable in the media arena. Using a new data set on lobbying by 286 groups on 12 issues in the United Kingdom and Germany, the article serves support for this theory: Umbrellas enjoy higher legislative access, but lower media access than groups without member organizations, irrespective of their individual membership or claimed constituency. The findings have implications for how we understand and study political representation.

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“…After all, attributing a transmission belt function assumes that interest groups simultaneously transmit societal interests to policy-makers and convey policy compromises to their membership (Braun 2015;Halpin and Fraussen 2017). This notion is especially relevant in neo-corporatist approaches to interest representation (Schmitter and Streeck 1999) and particularly applicable to the EU context as the European Commission explicitly requires such an intermediary function of the groups it reaches out to (European Commission 2001;Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007).…”

Section: Representational Capacitymentioning

confidence: 99%