Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Abstract

The Cuban missile crisis is a seminal event. For thirteen days of October 1962, there was a higher probability that more human lives would end suddenly than ever before in history. Had the worst occurred, the death of 100 million Americans, over 100 million Russians, and millions of Europeans as well would make previous natural calamities and inhumanities appear insignificant. Given the probability of disaster—which President Kennedy estimated as “between 1 out of 3 and even”—our escape seems awesome. This event symbolizes a central, if only partially thinkable, fact about our existence. That such consequences could follow from the choices and actions of national governments obliges students of government as well as participants in governance to think hard about these problems.Improved understanding of this crisis depends in part on more information and more probing analyses of available evidence. To contribute to these efforts is part of the purpose of this study. But here the missile crisis serves primarily as grist for a more general investigation.This study proceeds from the premise that marked improvement in our understanding of such events depends critically on more self-consciousness about what observers bring to the analysis. What each analyst sees and judges to be important is a function not only of the evidence about what happened but also of the “conceptual lenses” through which he looks at the evidence. The principal purpose of this essay is to explore some of the fundamental assumptions and categories employed by analysts in thinking about problems of governmental behavior, especially in foreign and military affairs.

Evolution Cum Agency: Toward a Model of Strategic Foresight

“…Our conception of this study is almost completely indebted to Graham Allison's "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis" (Allison, 1969). But whereas Allison focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis, we instead focus on one of the most important strategic innovations in the history of the financial services industry: Charles Merrill's "financial supermarket" business model.…”

Estados frágeis e proliferação nuclear: uma agenda de segurança pós-Guerra Fria

“…Os programas nucleares envolvem diversas organizações com interesses próprios, incluindo as instituições políticas de governo (que pode ou não ser democrático), as instituições militares, e as organizações científicas e industriais, responsáveis pela produção e manutenção dos armamentos. Cada um desses círculos tem uma racionalidade própria, associada a suas tradições e seus constrangimentos burocráticos, e alterações em suas formas internas de funcionamento podem ser custosas e demoradas (ALLISON, 1969;ZELIKOW, 1999). Além disso, essas organizações podem ter interesses conflitantes, em termos de autoridade, acesso a recursos ou responsabilidade em relação a eventuais falhas.…”

The Limits of Information? A Game Theoretic Contribution to Understanding the Development of an Indicators Policy for the UK Construction Industry

“…Since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), game theory has been employed in numerous attempts to understand human and institutional interactions across a range of contexts that includes policy studies, international relations (Allison, 1969), business strategy (takeover behaviour, monopolies) (Rasmusen, 1999), including most recently attempts to understand the supply chain relationships (Nagarajan and Sošić, 2008) and contributions in economics to explain market formation, functioning and price setting and importantly, where strategies have to be set in relation to government policy activities (Watkins, 2003). Attention has also been given over a long period to general problems of collective action (see for example Hume (1739) and Rousseau (1977) on the stag hunt game) in which multiple actors may choose to collaborate for potentially shared benefits.…”