Concepts of Evidence

Achinstein, Peter

doi:10.1093/mind/lxxxvii.1.22

Cited by 68 publications

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“…In Kelly [2014] we read that evidence "is the kind of thing which can make a difference to what one is justified in believing or ... what it is reasonable for one to believe" and later he adds that since "evidence is the sort of thing which confers justification ... it is natural to think that 'reason to believe' and 'evidence' are more or less synonymous." The link between 'evidence' and 'reasons to believe' is also clear in the 'principle of reasonable belief', presented by Achinstein [2010a]: if, in the light of background information Φ, κ is evidence that A, then, given Φ, κ is a good reason 5 The logic of evidence proposed by us does not intend to represent cognitive relations between agents and propositions. It is not an account of any kind of propositional attitude.…”

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confidence: 99%

An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth

Carnielli

Rodrigues

2017

Synthese

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The purpose of this paper is to present a paraconsistent formal system and a corresponding intended interpretation according to which true contradictions are not tolerated. Contradictions are, instead, epistemically understood as conflicting evidence, where evidence for a proposition A is understood as reasons for believing that A is true. The paper defines a paraconsistent and paracomplete natural deduction system, called the Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE ), and extends it to the Logic of Evidence and Truth (LETJ ). The latter is a logic of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness that is able to express not only preservation of evidence but also preservation of truth. LETJ is anti-dialetheist in the sense that, according to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, its consequence relation is trivial in the presence of any true contradiction. Adequate semantics and a decision method are presented for both BLE and LETJ , as well as some technical results that fit the intended interpretation.

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An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth

Carnielli

Rodrigues

2017

Synthese

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“…Los diversos usos y caracterizaciones de la noción de modelo (e.g. Suppes 1961;Achinstein 1968;Falguera 1994;Bailer-Jones 1999).…”

Section: La Didáctica De Las Ciencias Y La Investigación Sobre Modelosunclassified

Una caracterización semanticista de los modelos científicos para ciencia escolar

Bravo¹,

Ariza²

2014

Biografía

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RESUMENEn la didáctica de las ciencias, los análisis sobre lo que podría ser (y no ser) un modelo científico y sobre la importancia de vincular los modelos con las líneas de investigación de la disciplina vienen cobrando mayor relevancia en los últimos años. Hemos dado algunos pasos iniciales en la línea de esa vinculación; sin embargo, creemos que resulta interesante retomar las discusiones acerca de la naturaleza de los modelos partiendo de una perspectiva epistémica que nos permita seguir avanzando en la elucidación de sus características principales y en la identificación de aquellas más relevantes para la enseñanza de las ciencias y para la formación del profesorado de ciencias. Nuestra perspectiva de trabajo nos ubica en la escuela de la epistemología contemporánea conocida como "concepción semanticista" (dentro de la corriente representacional o modelística), escuela que constituye uno de los enfoques más fructíferos de las últimas déca-das para el análisis epistemológico de la ciencia, y que recientemente ha concitado la atención de los investigadores en didáctica de las ciencias. Palabras Clave:Modelo científico, características epistemológicas, escuela semanticista, modelización.

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“…This failure is said to have been exposed by the objections of Church (1949), Hempel (1951), Achinstein (1968), and Kaplan (1975).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More importantly, proponents of significance criteria have successfully responded to the major objections that have been raised. Thus Carnap (1956a) addresses Church's (1949) and Hempel's (1951) objection, Creath (1976) addresses Kaplan's (1975), and Schurz (1991;2014b) Achinstein's (1968); the latter two responses remain unscathed decades after their publications and, as I argue below, can be combined into a single criterion that retains the advantages of each.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical significance, predictive power, and explication

Surovell

2017

Synthese

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Criteria of empirical significance are supposed to state conditions under which (putative) reference to an unobservable object or property is "empirically meaningful." The intended kind of empirical meaningfulness should be necessary for admissibility into the selective contexts of scientific inquiry. I defend Justus's recent argument that the reasons generally given for rejecting the project of defining a significance criterion are unpersuasive. However, as I show, this project remains wedded to an overly narrow conception of its subject matter. Even the most cutting edge significance criteria identify empirical significance with predictive power, and thereby rule out vocabulary with legitimate scientific functions. In a nutshell, the problem is that there are ("shortcut") terms that reduce the computational burden of extracting predictions from theory, and that may therefore be scientifically useful, but that do not produce any novel predictions, and so are ruled scientifically inadmissibility by existing significance criteria. I spell out this objection by specifying shortcut terms that are ruled inadmissible by Creath's and Schurz's criteria. Having objected in this way to extant criteria, and to the equation of empirical significance with predictive power in general, I discuss an approach to defining empirical significance that is capable of avoiding my objection and, more ambitiously, that may break the cycle of "punctures and patches" that has plagued the project from the beginning. I gloss Goldfarb and Ricketts's idea of "case-by-case" delineations of empirically significant terms as the provision of special rather than general explications of the informal concept of empirical significance.

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Concepts of Evidence

Cited by 68 publications

References 0 publications

An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth

An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth

Una caracterización semanticista de los modelos científicos para ciencia escolar

Empirical significance, predictive power, and explication

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