2010
DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x10000403
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Concepts are a functional kind

Abstract: This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that "concept" ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery.

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Cited by 8 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…Yet, this selection goes further: It also provides us with a baseline from which the psychological concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering. For instance, in order to increase the scope and impact conceptual engineering may have on our conceptual apparatuses, future research in this direction could appropriately draw upon a psychological, invariantist characterization of concepts as bodies of information that are retrieved from our long-term memory to play a role in the cognitive processes that underlie our higher cognitive competences, and then combine it with a pluralist take on the basic kinds of bodies of information (e.g., exemplar, prototypes, and theories) in the form of a model of concepts as “multiply realiz[ed] functional kinds” (Lalumera 2010 : 218). However, this remains another story to be told.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, this selection goes further: It also provides us with a baseline from which the psychological concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering. For instance, in order to increase the scope and impact conceptual engineering may have on our conceptual apparatuses, future research in this direction could appropriately draw upon a psychological, invariantist characterization of concepts as bodies of information that are retrieved from our long-term memory to play a role in the cognitive processes that underlie our higher cognitive competences, and then combine it with a pluralist take on the basic kinds of bodies of information (e.g., exemplar, prototypes, and theories) in the form of a model of concepts as “multiply realiz[ed] functional kinds” (Lalumera 2010 : 218). However, this remains another story to be told.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The cognitive processes here in play consist of a series of operations that access the information stored in the agent's long‐term memory in order to bring about the functions to be fulfilled by the exercise of a given higher cognitive competence. These operations in turn can be reduced to category‐abstraction, on the one hand, which is ‘the “bottom‐up” process of extracting information from a single encounter with an object or property‐instance, and generalising such information to all encounters with that object or property,’ and category‐induction, on the other hand, which is ‘the complementary “top‐down” process of projecting such knowledge to new encounters’ (Lalumera, 2010, p. 218). As for the functions fulfilled by the higher cognitive competences, they are typically those of categorisation, deduction, induction, action‐planning, analogy‐making, and linguistic understanding.…”
Section: A Positive Proposalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These two desiderata have been satisfied by the development in two steps of a psychological characterisation of concepts as ‘multiply realiz[ed] functional kinds’ (cf. Lalumera, 2010). With this concept of concept at hand, the upshot for conceptual engineering as the method for the cognitive amelioration of our conceptual devices is that it will then consist in redesigning the mind's patterns of inferences, possibly at each step of information processing (that is, from retrieval to use) and at any level of abstraction for the informational content (that is, for any basic kinds of concepts).…”
Section: A Positive Proposalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Oxford Research Encyclopedia defines Lexical Semantics as the study of word meanings, i.e., concepts [25], where concepts are assumed to be constructed by humans through language. In the same line of thinking, this research focuses on Visual Semantics, namely, on how humans build concepts when using vision to perceive the world.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%