Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things?

Löhr, Guido

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1798-4

Cited by 22 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…The taxonomy for distinguishing the different theories concepts that are available to conceptual engineering is pretty basic, again, in that it builds on an alternative between two main frameworks, which further correlate with different models of and approaches to concepts (Johnston & Leslie, 2012; Löhr, 2020; Machery, 2009; Peacocke, 1992; Rey, 1983, 1985). The first framework available for theorising concepts is that of mainstream analytic philosophy of mind and language (e.g., Burge, 1993; Fodor, 1975; Peacocke, 1992).…”

Section: The Main Foundational Issuementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, as I understand them, the higher cognitive tasks whose execution is achieved through the exercise of these higher cognitive competences simply correspond to the overall cognitive activity they contribute to performing in a given context (reading, listening, talking, reasoning, planning, etc.). In light of their function thus explicated, conceptual contents cognitively characterised can be seen as by‐default ‘categorizing devices’ (Löhr, 2020).…”

Section: A Positive Proposalmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Broad‐spectrum conceptual engineering

Isaac

2021

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Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. On its ‘broad‐spectrum’ version, it is expected to be appropriately applicable to any of our representation‐involving cognitive activities, with major consequences for our whole cognitive life. This paper is about the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering thus characterised. With a view to ensuring the actionability of conceptual engineering as a broad‐spectrum method, it addresses the issue of how best to construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering and successively defends the theses that conceptual engineering should be: (i) About concepts, (ii) psychologically theorised, (iii) as multiply realised functional kinds. Thereby, I claim to theoretically secure and justify the maximum scope, flexibility, and impact for the method of conceptual engineering on our representational devices in our whole cognitive life—in other words, a broad‐spectrum version of conceptual engineering.

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Section: The Main Foundational Issuementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Positive Proposalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Broad‐spectrum conceptual engineering

Isaac

2021

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“…To really change Piers' behavior, on the representationalist picture, Munroe has to change his "categorization device" (Löhr, 2020) or "conception" of racism, i.e., the set of beliefs, stereotypes, theories, exemplars or prototypes based on which he actually applies the word 'racism' or the concept of racism. She could, for example, show him movies that present him with less obvious cases of racism hoping that this will change Piers' prototypes and exemplars.…”

Section: Representation Engineeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commitment engineering: conceptual engineering without representations

Löhr

2021

Synthese

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It is largely assumed that conceptual engineering is essentially about revising, introducing, or eliminating representational devices, in particular the intension and extension of words and concepts. However, tying conceptual engineering too closely to representations is risky. Not everyone endorses the notion of representation as theoretically helpful or even real. Not everyone thinks that concepts or meanings should be understood in terms of the notion of representation. Does this mean that conceptual engineering is not interesting or relevant for these skeptics? In this paper, I motivate and propose a non-representationalist construal of conceptual engineering. I argue that conceptual engineers can be understood as primarily engineering linguistic entitlements and commitments rather than representational devices. Note that this account is non-representationalist, but explicitly not anti-representationalist. Representations may play a significant role when it comes to justifying and completing commitment engineering projects.

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“…At those memory locations are stored a large array of representations, including prototypes, theories, and other informational structures. These informational structures constitute the “conception” that falls under the concept (Camp, 2015; Löhr, 2020; Rey, 1983). The concept itself is an unstructured symbol akin to a Fodorian atomistic concept.…”

Section: Concepts As Pointersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Polysemy and thought: Toward a generative theory of concepts

Quilty‐Dunn

2020

Mind & Language

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Most theories of concepts take concepts to be structured bodies of information used in categorization and inference. This paper argues for a version of atomism, on which concepts are unstructured symbols. However, traditional Fodorian atomism is falsified by polysemy and fails to provide an account of how concepts figure in cognition. This paper argues that concepts are generative pointers, that is, unstructured symbols that point to memory locations where cognitively useful bodies of information are stored and can be deployed to resolve polysemy. The notion of generative pointers allows for unresolved ambiguity in thought and provides a basis for conceptual engineering.

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Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things?

Cited by 22 publications

References 41 publications

Broad‐spectrum conceptual engineering

Broad‐spectrum conceptual engineering

Commitment engineering: conceptual engineering without representations

Polysemy and thought: Toward a generative theory of concepts

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