Computational Phenotypes

Abstract

This book confronts the hotly debated claim that language is a species specific trait of humans. It also considers the notion that disentangling the evolutionary history of language is one of science's hardest problems. Building on the recent conceptual breakthroughs of the EvoDevo paradigm, Balari and Lorenzo argue that language is not so exceptional a er all. It is, rather, just the human version of a fairly common and conservative organic system which they call the Central Computational Complex. The authors also propose that interspecies variation of this organ is restricted to (i) accessible memory resources, and (ii) patterns of external connectivity, both being the result of perturbations on the system underlying its development. The book, written accessibly for both biologists and linguists, offers a fresh perspective on language as a naturally evolved phenomenon.

It is an organ, it is new, but it is not a new organ. Conceptualizing language from a homological perspective

“…Building upon prior reconstructions of the FL as a system of natural computation plus an associated array of interfaces with other cognitive systems (Hauser et al, 2002;Balari and Lorenzo, 2013), we argue that language only qualifies as an evolutionary novelty in Wagner's weakest sense: i.e., as a Type II novelty, which means that it does not purport the introduction of a new organ-or Type I novelty. The FL, according to the view put forward here, derives from the evolution of new "states" of computational power and connectivity of a character-the Central Computational Complex (CCC)-whose "identity" largely predates its human instantiation.…”

“…] no consensus regarding the essential nature of the language phenotype" (Bolhuis et al, 2014, p. 1). We share with these authors that in order to circumscribe the "character identity" of language-an obvious prerequisite to progress in explaining its evolution, the task must be undertaken of reducing it to its bare essentials (Balari and Lorenzo, 2013). Such an FIGURE 1 | The language phenotype: a minimalist reduction of language to its bare architectural essentials.…”

“…For example, one may entertain the idea, given the obvious fact that sequentially organized forms of behavior apart from language are ubiquitous, that an organic component of brains exists-perhaps once a certain degree of organization is attained (Balari and Lorenzo, 2013, Chap. 8)-subject to interspecific variation along the following two main axes:…”

Components of the Language-Ready Brain

“…Petersson et al (2012) reveal the inadequacy of the classical Broca-WernickeLichtheim language model of the brain by noting how the language network extends to substantial parts of superior and middle temporal cortex, inferior parietal cortex, along with subcortical areas such as the basal ganglia (Balari and Lorenzo, 2013), the hippocampus and the thalamus (Theofanopoulou and Boeckx, Forthcoming a). The network is also implicated in more general cognitive systems like the default-mode network and the multiple demand system.…”

“…Dean et al (2012) also show how β is an excellent candidate for comparing old and new information from distinct modalities due to its wider temporal windows; that is, it would compare phase heads (old information) with late-merged non-phasal elements like complements (new information), likely drawing on different conceptual representations and hence different "core knowledge systems" and brain regions (Spelke, 2010). Related both to Balari and Lorenzo's (2013) claim that the basal ganglia is the center of their "Central Computational Complex" and Jouen et al's (2013) findings that this structure is implicated in acquiring the serial response order of a sequence, Theofanopoulou and Boeckx (Forthcoming b) propose that this region holds one of the γ -supported items before slowing it down to the β frequency as a consequence of the conduction delays resulting from the surrounding neural regions. Thus the β band accomplishes the role of labels, a claim supported by findings that β activity maintains existing cognitive states (Engel and Fries, 2010).…”