It is an organ, it is new, but it is not a new organ. Conceptualizing language from a homological perspective

Abstract

It is a widely shared opinion among specialists that language is an evolutionary innovation, or that it contains some key evolutionary innovations. However, such claims are not based on a correspondingly consensual concept of "evolutionary innovation," but are rather expressed on atheoretical grounds. This fact has thus far acted as an obstacle for the collaborative effort upon which the task of disentangling the evolution of this human capacity should be built. In this paper, we suggest a formal approach to the issue, based on Wagner's recent theory of homologies and novelties. Within this new framework, we conclude that language is the human instantiation (thus an "homolog") of a character widely represented in the nervous system of animals, which incorporates a number of interdependent innovative states that allows us conceptualizing it as a "variational modality" of this ancient organ.

The Oscillopathic Nature of Language Deficits in Autism: From Genes to Language Evolution

“…However, it is functionally related to the FOXP2 and ROBO/SLIT interactomes that are claimed to be involved in the externalization of language (see Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco, 2014b for details; Figure 3 ). Overall, the FOXP2-ROBO/SLIT-RUNX2 connections are interpreted as the result of an evolutionary convergence between the ancient externalization component and the emerging conceptual-intentional component (although see Balari and Lorenzo, 2015 for an argument that these latter networks are more heavily involved in the computational system).…”

What is “homology thinking” and what is it for?

“…Homology thinking explains the properties of a homolog (or a range of properties among a homologs's character states) by citing either an initial condition or a series of events in the history of a homolog” (p. 397 in Ereshefsky, ). Interestingly, the notion of homology thinking arose not in evolutionary biology per se but rather was put forward by some evolutionary approaches to behavior and cognition (Griffiths, ; Matthen, ; Ereshefsky, ; Matthen, ) and more recently is used in evolutionary linguistics (Balari and Lorenzo, , ), even though the homology concept of course arose in the comparative biosciences (see [Panchen, ] for a short history of the concept). Never the less, in 2012 Marc Ereshefsky made a strong argument for the utility of homology thinking in biology in general, concluding that homology thinking leads to a richer and deeper understanding of biological phenomena than adaptationist/functionalist explanations (which Ereshefsky called “analogy explanations”).…”

“…In this brief commentary, I want to expand on Ereshefsky's approach and explain what homology thinking can mean for biology from the perspective of a developmental genetic approach to homology (Wagner, ). Homology thinking also plays a role in the study of culture and human behavior (Griffiths, ; Balari and Lorenzo, ; Tomlinson, ), but I will limit my remarks to the study of biological evolution.…”

Cognitive phylogenies, the Darwinian logic of descent, and the inadequacy of cladistic thinking

“…As discussed extensively in Balari and Lorenzo ( 2015 ) and the references cited therein (especially Wagner, 2014 ), the root of the problem lies in how one thinks of evolutionary novelties. Evolution, generally, and evolution of cognition, specifically, does not operate in a simplistic innovative way; rather, it reorganizes already existing generic mechanisms, recruiting them into new uses.…”

“…Likewise, evolutionary biologists have learned to conceive of “phenotypic novelty” as “largely reorganizational rather than a product of innovative genes” (West-Eberhard, 2005 ). Cognitive biologists ought to adopt this perspective as well (For relevant discussion, we again refer to Balari and Lorenzo, 2015 ).…”