Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria

Hoffman, Mitchell; León, Gianmarco; Lombardi, María Rosa

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.002

Cited by 67 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 51 publications

(34 reference statements)

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“…Analyzing the state and Republican elections of 1949-2010 in Austria, it can be concluded that legal norms providing for compulsory voting with weakly executed penalties in the form of fines increase the turnout by about 10 percentage points [3]. A similar conclusion also follows from the analysis of the statistics of participation in the elections of citizens of Belgium and Italy.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 58%

“…Elections at which a mandatory vote is established are not an ideal indicator of the true preferences of the population [12]. The obligation to vote influences, above all, the turnout of those citizens who are not informed, who have no or minimal interest in politics [15].There is empirical evidence that richer economic classes have a higher level of political participation. Forced voting can be a useful mechanism for equalizing the percentage ratio of voter turnout between rich and poor [16].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Transformation of electoral right to electoral responsibility: opportunity or necessity

Bokov¹

2019

Proceedings of the 1st International Scientific Practical Conference "The Individual and Society in the Modern Geopolitical Env

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The paper considers compulsory voting as a means of increasing voter turnout. The behavior of citizens with an active electoral right, but not participating in the voting (non-voters) can be compared with the behavior of a stowaway in public transport: even if he does not pay the fare, there will still be transport, because there are those who pay the fare. The non-voter does not participate in the creation, he only consumes. It is obvious that if nobody takes part in the elections, the foundations of democracy will collapse. Obliging to participate in elections can have both positive and negative effects on the development of civil society, raising the level of electoral and legal culture of the population, and developing state institutions. It is possible that the imposition of sanctions on mandatory elections may also reduce recognition of democracy. Ideas related to the possibility of deprivation of citizenship of those not participating in elections are critically evaluated. It is emphasized that there is insufficient evidence to judge the relationship between voter turnout and voting results. It is proposed to clearly affirm the obligation of state and municipal employees to participate in elections. If the level of citizenship and electoral culture of voters becomes higher, the issue of compulsory vote will lose its relevance. Voluntary voting is usually better than compulsory.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 58%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transformation of electoral right to electoral responsibility: opportunity or necessity

Bokov¹

2019

Proceedings of the 1st International Scientific Practical Conference "The Individual and Society in the Modern Geopolitical Env

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“…Compulsory voting's upward impact on participation levels out inequities in turnout, thus increasing the proportion of the voting population that is of low socioeconomic status—and less engaged with politics (e.g., Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Miller ; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi ; Jaitman ; Singh ). Yet, at the same time, compulsory voting may tackle disengagement.…”

Section: How Compulsory Voting Affects Parties’ Vote‐seeking Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5; Blais ; Cancela and Geys ) and makes the voting population more reflective of the electorate (e.g., Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Miller ; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi ; Jaitman ; Singh ). There is also a burgeoning literature on the effects of compulsory voting on vote choices (e.g., Dassonneville et al., forthcoming; Dassonneville Hooghe, and Miller ; Katz and Levin, ; Selb and Lachat ; Singh , forthcoming‐b), the success of the left and right (e.g., Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid ; Birch , 120–28; Fowler ; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi ; Miller and Dassonneville ), political sophistication (e.g., Birch , chap. 4; Córdova and Rangel ; de Leon and Rizzi ; León ; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks ; Sheppard ; Shineman ), and attitudes toward democracy (e.g., Birch , 112–15; Singh, forthcoming‐a).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Compulsory Voting and Parties’ Vote‐Seeking Strategies

Singh¹

2018

American J Political Sci

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I advance a theory about how compulsory voting affects the behavior of political parties. The theory suggests that parties will pivot toward programmatic vote‐seeking strategies and away from clientelistic tactics, such as vote buying, where voting is compulsory. I test my expectations in three separate studies, using several data sources and empirical approaches. In Study 1, cross‐national analyses show that parties behave more programmatically under compulsory voting and that vote buying is less common where voting is mandatory. In Study 2, synthetic control and difference‐in‐differences analyses show that a switch to compulsory voting in Thailand produced an increase in programmatic vote seeking. In Study 3, a list experiment conducted in tandem with a natural experiment shows that compulsory voting leads parties to rely less on vote‐buying tactics in Argentina. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings, which together are broadly supportive of my theoretical expectations.

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“…Voter turnout in municipal and provincial elections increases by around 1.27 and 1.43 percentage points (between a quarter and a third of a standard deviation) if the number of entailed farms per 100 inhabitants 1 New studies examine how electoral institutions such as compulsory voting, opening hours of polling stations and prepaid postage influence voter turnout (e.g. Garmann 2017;Hoffman et al 2017;Schelker and Schneiter 2017;Bechtel et al 2018;Gaebler et al 2020; Potrafke and Roesel 2020). 2 Average SVP vote shares have constantly been below the 50 percent-threshold since 2010.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do inheritance rules affect voter turnout? Evidence from an Alpine region

et al. 2020

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We examine the relationship between inheritance rules and voter turnout. Inheritance rules are measured by entailed farms in South Tyrol: land properties whose inheritance is regulated by a law similar to the right of primogeniture. Using data for municipalities between 1998 and 2010, we show that voter turnout is high in municipalities with many entailed farms relative to population. The effect is based on local elections. If the number of entailed farms per 100 inhabitants increases by one standard deviation, voting turnout in municipal and provincial elections increases by around 1.27 and 1.43 percentage points (around 25 and 35% of a standard deviation). Our results suggest that entailed farm owners themselves are more likely to vote, and that entailed farms owners encourage other citizens of their municipality to participate in local elections.

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Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria

Cited by 67 publications

References 51 publications

Transformation of electoral right to electoral responsibility: opportunity or necessity

Transformation of electoral right to electoral responsibility: opportunity or necessity

Compulsory Voting and Parties’ Vote‐Seeking Strategies

Do inheritance rules affect voter turnout? Evidence from an Alpine region

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