2021
DOI: 10.1080/1060586x.2021.1966988
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Composition of the ruling elite, incentives for productive usage of rents, and prospects for Russia’s limited access order

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Cited by 18 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The collective impact of these factors is that, much like in the U.S., where diverging in policymaking is difficult due to the liberal hegemonic views of the American elites (Walt, 2018), disagreement in Russian policymaking is practically impossible due to the "dominance of security priorities" (Yakovlev, 2021). This prevents long-term strategies from stretching towards economic development and expansion of material resources.…”
Section: Russia's Presence In the East In The Post-soviet Periodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The collective impact of these factors is that, much like in the U.S., where diverging in policymaking is difficult due to the liberal hegemonic views of the American elites (Walt, 2018), disagreement in Russian policymaking is practically impossible due to the "dominance of security priorities" (Yakovlev, 2021). This prevents long-term strategies from stretching towards economic development and expansion of material resources.…”
Section: Russia's Presence In the East In The Post-soviet Periodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These processes have been extensively analyzed by Russian and Western sociologists (Ponedelkov, Starostin 2004;Kordonskii 2008;Semenova 2012;Hughes, John 2001;Yakovlev 2021). However, Russian scholars may face challenges in transcending their lived context, while Western sociologists usually do not have sufficient levels of immersion.…”
Section: Elites Of Russiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The literature on autocratic regimes examines how an autocrat chooses the size and characteristics of their inner circle, which are the keys to power, and how this, in turn, determines their regime's policy choices and performance (see Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003;Egorov and Sonin, 2011). Several studies demonstrate that Putin's regime distributes political rents to the top federal bureaucracy, politically connected big business (oligarchs), and heads of security forces (siloviki) to stay in power (Marten, 2019;Yakovlev, 2021;Trantidis, forthcoming). By contrast, Batinti and Kopstein (2022) show that Putin's regime follows a rent-extractive model.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%