Compliance Management under the Chemical Weapons Convention

Abstract

UNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessary reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors.

A Modular-Incremental Approach to Improving Compliance Verification With the Biological Weapons Convention

“…OSINT refers to intelligence derived from publicly available information, as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access. 24 It has been successfully used in conjunction with other sources to monitor compliance with nuclear 25 , 26 and chemical weapons 6 disarmament treaties. Although the dual-use nature of biological activities complicates the types of signals that can be derived from open-source data, the application of OSINT techniques to monitor BWC compliance is not novel.…”

“… 3 For the Chemical Weapons Convention 4 or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 5 for example, verification is based on a framework driven by accounting that involves the meticulous documentation of facilities, tools, and raw materials of relevance to the fulfillment of state treaty obligations. 6 …”

The TPNW in Practice: Elements for Effective National Implementation

“…Experience across WMD regimes suggest that the initial declaration itself can present a challenge. For instance, the CWC contains a similar obligation in its Article 3, and almost a third of initial declarations remained outstanding two years after entry into force of the Convention as a result of delays in national preparations, lack of awareness of obligations, and inadequate technical capacity or legal frameworks (Trapp 2019). However, CWC initial declarations require States to specify the "precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory" of chemical weapons (including old and abandoned chemical weapons), provide "all available information" around production facilities including their scope of activities, and provide "a general plan for destruction" including specific "actions to be taken for closure" of those facilities (CWC 1993).…”

Compliance and Enforcement in WMD-related Treaties

“…Similarly, the CWC, as covered by Trapp, has a number of provisions related to national implementation. 10 Most important is that States Parties enact penal legislation to proscribe at the national level those activities prohibited under the CWC. 11 In other words, the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons must be prohibited as a matter of domestic law, affecting individuals within that legal space.…”