Complete EAP Method: User Efficient and Forward Secure Authentication Protocol for IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs

An EAP-Based Mutual Authentication Protocol for WLAN-Connected IoT Devices

“…Therefore, to secure the communication between the D and AS, several symmetric and asymmetric encryptionbased authentication protocols have been proposed, with the majority of them relying on the EAP architecture. Asymmetric encryption-based authentication protocols offer excellent security but come at a high cost, making them unsuitable for ultra-low-cost IoT devices [9]- [13]. In order to address the cost issue, several symmetric encryption-based authentication protocols are proposed.…”

“…However, some recent findings [14], [15] reveal that although these protocols are lightweight but do not ensure the prominent security features such as perfect forward secrecy, identity protection, protection from traceability attack, privileged insider attack protection, ephemeral secret leakage, and many of them do not support fast reconnect for quick re-authentication. To the best of our knowledge, all the symmetric encryption-based authentication protocols [9]- [13] need a secure channel during the registration process. However, this is only achievable in private premises such as smart homes, smart factories, smart firm etc., and finding a secure channel is infeasible in public places such as smart hospital, smart shops, etc.…”

“…Additional security needs, such as DoS attacks, perfect forward secrecy, and lightweight processing, are not met. In the WLAN context, Chan et al [9] created a user authentication system. Though, it is lightweight but prone to replay attack.…”

FDIPP: False Data Injection Prevention Protocol for Smart Grid Distribution Systems

“…The EAP authentication mechanism proposed in [41] is integrated into this phase as it is designed to provide forward secrecy with low computation and communication cost. Moreover, this mechanism meets all the security requirements of RFC 4017 [41]. Thus, it is aligned to both the communication architecture requirements and the NIST guidelines mentioned in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.…”

“…A security analysis of the Node Authentication phase can be obtained using theoretical proof following the details mentioned in [41,44]. Through this analysis, it can be proved that the Node Authentication phase provides mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and secure key exchange provided that the employed symmetric encryption is secure against adaptively chosen-ciphertext attack, which is the case with AES-GCM [45].…”