Competing in the Gray Zone: Russian Tactics and Western Responses

Abstract

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Military Organizations Can Walk and Chew Gum at the Same Time

“…This is especially the case for influence operations and disruptive “gray zone” activities—activities that occur below the threshold of conflict. The gray zone refers, in part, to a contested information space where multiple entities, state and nonstate actors alike, compete to maintain control over ideas, messages, and information (Matisek, 2017; Morris et al, 2019; Pettyjohn & Wasser, 2019). With their emphasis on cultural reproduction and certainty generation, the rigid military structures favored by Hasselbladh and Ydén (2020) promote rigid thinking.…”

Cyber Security Politics

“…The main conceptual debate revolves around whether it is a new form of competition (Hicks et al 2019;Hoffman 2007) or just an operational environment (Chambers 2016). The former interpretation is particularly aligned with US military phasing and planning (Pettyjohn and Wasser 2019). Critics, however, have argued that such a denomination has only contributed to conceptual muddling as it is not clear whether there are real boundaries between the phases and to what extent they can be applied in practice (Pettyjohn and Wasser 2019).…”

“…The former interpretation is particularly aligned with US military phasing and planning (Pettyjohn and Wasser 2019). Critics, however, have argued that such a denomination has only contributed to conceptual muddling as it is not clear whether there are real boundaries between the phases and to what extent they can be applied in practice (Pettyjohn and Wasser 2019). As a result, part of the scholarship has moved away from it and is instead highlighting the latter understanding, to which the authors subscribe.…”

“…According to this strand of literature, gray zone conflicts have the following characteristics (Cantwell 2017;Chambers 2016;Corn 2018;Hicks et al 2019;Pettyjohn and Wasser 2019;Votel et al 2016): First, the gray zone is a distinct operating environment between peacetime diplomatic and geopolitical interactions and conventional war where intense political, economic, information, and military competition takes place. Gray zone conflicts thus mostly occur under the threshold of war.…”

Gaming Gray Zone Tactics: Design Considerations for a Structured Strategic Game

“…Games are intrinsically nonreplicable because you cannot hold the players constant. Even participants who have played the game before will have learned from that prior experience and therefore aren't the "same" players.15 Pettyjohn and Wasser, 2019. …”