Military Organizations Can Walk and Chew Gum at the Same Time

Abstract

This article is a response to a recent publication by Hasselbladh and Ydén in this journal, entitled “Why Military Organizations Are Cautious About Organizational Learning?” Through their use of dichotomous logic, the authors argue continuous learning poses a threat to the functioning of military organizations. The following commentary argues for a necessary coexistence between the mainstays of the traditional bureaucratic military organization presented by Hasselbladh and Ydén and continuous learning required by military organizations to compete and cope with technological advancements and gray zone challenges afforded by the modern operating environment.

The Relevance and Presumed Innocence of Learning: A Reply to Soeters and Talbot and Fischer

“…We do agree with Talbot and Fischer (2021) that military units vary in terms of learning "affordability"-Special Forces are, in this respect, not equal to, for example, mechanized infantry units. Nevertheless, we do argue that military organizations have been, are, and most likely will continue to be cautious regarding change and the way it is managed.…”

“…196-202). We do not want to discount the examples by Talbot and Fischer (2021) regarding the learning efforts in the Australian military, but we note that similar descriptions could be heard in most Western nations involved in the Iraq and Afghanistan operations. While undoubtedly much learning was accomplished during these conflicts, the results thus far nevertheless indicate limitations to the utility of force to quote Rupert Smith.…”

“…presumes, as do Talbot and Fischer (2021), that our article presents a case against "learning," understood as general development of professional practice. This is, of course, not the case.…”

“…It is a myth that predicaments of this type can largely be avoided with careful planning and preparation beforehand. Talbot and Fischer (2021) mention "gray zone" challenges, which are considerable and worthy of attention. We do not deny that meeting such challenges requires a lot of analytical effort, and we would recommend that governments address this threat comprehensively, possibly rethinking the overall design of defense and security structures.…”

“…There are functional reasons why military organizations are cautious but also, as in other organizations, numerous sociopolitical reasons why change is controlled from the top. Soeters (2020) as well as Talbot and Fischer (2021) seem quite sanguine about this-intent on bringing "substantive rationality" to their efforts to support change in organizations. One could hardly be further away from the mainstream of organizational sociology.…”