Compatibilism and the Sinlessness of the Redeemed in Heaven

Cowan, Steven B.

doi:10.5840/faithphil201128441

Cited by 23 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…This means that there is no possible world where both can exist. 4 Mackie adds two other premises to show the contradiction: -A good thing eliminates evil as far as it can‖ and -There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.‖ 5 One can modify the latter premise to -An omnipotent thing can do anything that is metaphysically possible including prevent evil.‖ 6 If both propositions are true, it follows that an omnibenevolent and omnipotent being would prevent all evils (since it could and would want to). Thus, it would be impossible that both evil and such a being exists.…”

Section: The Problem Of Evil and The Free Will Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will

Choo¹,

Goh²

2019

IJTPS

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Alvin Plantinga has famously responded to the logical problem of evil by appealing to the intrinsic value of significant free will. A problem, however, arises because traditional theists believe that both God and the redeemed who go to heaven cannot do wrong acts. This entails that both God and the redeemed in heaven lack significant freedom. If significant freedom is indeed valuable, then God and the redeemed in heaven would lack something intrinsically valuable. However, if significant freedom is not intrinsically valuable, then Plantinga's reply to the logical problem of evil fails. In this paper, we assess three contemporary solutions to the dilemma above. The first is the love solution, which proposes that significant freedom is necessary for agents to love, and loving others is intrinsically good. The second is the soul-making solution, which argues that significant freedom is necessary for selfdeveloping one's moral character, and having a self-developed moral character is intrinsically good. The third is the derivative free will solution, which argues that significant freedom is necessary for derivative free will in heaven, and derivative free will is intrinsically good. We raise problems against all three solutions and instead defend a fourth solutionthe ultimate responsibility solution. That is, SF is instrumentally valuable as it gives agents ultimate responsibility with regards to morally significant acts. Finally, we defend the ultimate responsibility solution against two major objections.

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Section: The Problem Of Evil and The Free Will Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will

Choo¹,

Goh²

2019

IJTPS

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“…Pawl and Timpe (2009;2013) pursue this strategy. Steven Cowan (2011) has criticised their view, while Christopher Brown (2015) has attempted to expand on it.…”

Section: The Problem Arising From God's Own Freedommentioning

confidence: 99%

Some Problems of Heavenly Freedom

Kittle

2018

TheoLogica

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Abstract:In this essay I identify four different problems of heavenly freedom; i.e., problems that arise for those who hold that the redeemed in heaven have free will. They are: the problem arising from God's own freedom, the problem of needing to praise the redeemed for not sinning in heaven, the problem of needing to affirm that the redeemed freely refrain from sinning, and the problem arising from a commitment to the free will defence. I explore how some of these problems vary depending on the notion of free will which is endorsed. And I suggest that because these differing problems arise from distinct theological and/or philosophical commitments, there is little reason to think that one and the same feature or property of an account of heavenly freedom will address them all.

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“…Such decisions would be morally weighty in two ways: first, a person could be judged better for having performed a supererogatory action, even though leaving it undone would not be wrong; second, someone might improve her character by performing supererogatory actions. These latter points are controversial and Steven Cowan (2011, 430) has raised some important objections to them. By contrast, Christopher Brown (2015), while agreeing with some of Cowan's points, has argued that the redeemed will face ‘morally grave’ choices in heaven: a kind of moral choice which doesn't depend on the existence of supererogatory actions.…”

Section: Heavenly Freedom and The Value Of Choicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices

Kittle

2018

Rel. Stud.

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Sennett (1999) and Pawl and Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom. Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this article I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl and Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show why Matheson is mistaken to claim that the value of free choice depends on an agent retaining the ability to change their mind; in so doing I demonstrate that some choices which result in fixed outcomes – a feature of the choices leading to impeccability – can indeed be valuable even if they cannot be undone.

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Compatibilism and the Sinlessness of the Redeemed in Heaven

Cited by 23 publications

References 0 publications

The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will

The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will

Some Problems of Heavenly Freedom

Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices

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