Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military

Barany, Zoltán

doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0069

Cited by 133 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Scholars have framed the question as whether "the" military will support embattled autocrats, 11 with initial accounts focusing on the predictive power of the military's degree of institutionalization, 12 response to a particular protest strategy, 13 or officers' collective grievances and identity. 14 This focus on a corporate military apparatus is problematic, however, given that militaries have not always acted as cohesive institutions.…”

Section: The Deserter's Dilemma: Decision-making Under Extreme Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Disaffection to Desertion: How Networks Facilitate Military Insubordination in Civil Conflict

Koehler¹,

Ohl²,

Albrecht³

2016

Comp Politics

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Soldiers contemplating desertion from the military amid a civil conflict are confronted with a dilemma: although they might harbor strong grievances against continued military service, they face incentives to falsify their preferences and stay in the army. This dilemma arises due to the extreme risks associated with the process of desertion on the one hand and the fact that relations between deserters and rebels are dominated by mistrust, on the other hand. The first problem renders the potential costs of desertion extraordinarily high because soldiers face a credible threat of punishment. The second renders the potential payoffs of desertion uncertain because deserters have reasons to believe that rebels will treat them with suspicion or even hostility.Given these extreme decision-making conditions, why would soldiers desert at all? We argue that soldiers assume the extreme risk of desertion when their social networks persuade them of the value and feasibility of desertion. Family, friends, and close hometown connections are crucial in turning disaffection into desertion by activating norms of trust that help convince soldiers that desertion is an acceptable behavior. Such connections also facilitate coordination with rebel networks, which allows soldiers to escape their positions.We draw on extensive fieldwork on the contemporary conflict in Syria to support this argument. Insights from more than ninety interviews with former service members of the Syrian military who are now based in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey allow us to address the meso-dynamics of desertion. Our results show that trust transmitted through strong network ties is a crucial factor in moving soldiers from passive disaffection with military service and the regime to active insubordination.Our argument speaks to several debates in conflict studies and political science more generally. In order to answer the question of why individuals would take extremely high risks in return for uncertain benefits, we draw on the literatures on rebellion and insurgency, 1 as well as on ideas from network theory and social movement studies. 2 Conventional accounts have difficulty explaining the behavior of deserters, which can

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Section: The Deserter's Dilemma: Decision-making Under Extreme Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Disaffection to Desertion: How Networks Facilitate Military Insubordination in Civil Conflict

Koehler¹,

Ohl²,

Albrecht³

2016

Comp Politics

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show abstract

“…Here we provide a more specific account by country. The actual trigger for President Ben Ali's flight from Tunisia on January 14, 2011, less than a month after the initial demonstration, was the army command's refusal to give the order to open fire on demonstrators after they had overrun the police and presidential guard (Barany, 2011). During the chaotic days that followed-absent a government and credible police forces-the army continued to play a politically neutral role, while also protecting property from looters and people from the older security forces (Kirkpatrick, 2011).…”

Section: The Uprisingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Military westernization and state repression in the post-Cold War era

Swed

Weinreb

2015

Social Science Research

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“…In relative terms, the military's budget had declined compared to that of the Ministry of Interior, a trend that the military resented. 44 This rift between the military and internal security services illustrates the distinct institutional agendas that exist within the Egyptian security apparatus, a distinction that scholars often take for granted. 45 Additionally, the military felt threatened by the increasing "civilianization" of Egyptian politics.…”

Section: Egypt: A-communal Strategy and Regime Defectionmentioning

confidence: 99%