2013
DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2013.802983
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Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring

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Cited by 101 publications
(47 citation statements)
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“…Despite institutional coup-proofing measures, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria have seen very different outcomes in the context of the Arab Spring (Makara 2013): While the military defected to the opposition movement and was itself highly active in overthrowing the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the military remained largely loyal to the ruling government under Assad in Syria. Interestingly, the distribution of military organizations mirrors our previous rationale: Syria had 1,840 effective military organizations in 2011 according to our data described in the following, while Tunisia and Egypt could rely on 1,742 and 2,414 organizations respectively in that year.…”
Section: A Brief Overview Of the Literaturementioning
confidence: 98%
“…Despite institutional coup-proofing measures, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria have seen very different outcomes in the context of the Arab Spring (Makara 2013): While the military defected to the opposition movement and was itself highly active in overthrowing the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the military remained largely loyal to the ruling government under Assad in Syria. Interestingly, the distribution of military organizations mirrors our previous rationale: Syria had 1,840 effective military organizations in 2011 according to our data described in the following, while Tunisia and Egypt could rely on 1,742 and 2,414 organizations respectively in that year.…”
Section: A Brief Overview Of the Literaturementioning
confidence: 98%
“…The respective military's engagement was decisive in determining the immediate course of events once people took to the streets (Barany, 2012;Bellin, 2012;Makara, 2013). Military officers have deposed long-serving presidents in Egypt (actively) and Tunisia (withdrawing support from President Ben Ali).…”
Section: Coup-proofing In the Middle East Revisitedmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Studies of political-military relations in the MENA region found that, prior to the uprisings, coup-proofing strategies were applied by authoritarian incumbents to secure the loyalty of their armed forces and, at the same time, keep ambitious officers in their barracks. Scholars of Middle East politics offered a substantial contribution to the broader body of literature on coup-proofing, based on their empirical expertise of the inner working mechanisms of regimes and armies (Springborg, 1987;Brooks, 1998;Quinlivan, 1999;Kamrava, 2000;Harb, 2003;Droz-Vincent, 2007;Cook, 2007;McLauchlin, 2010;Bou Nassif, 2013;Makara, 2013). The intervention of officers to protect respective regimes in Syria and Bahrain bears witness to the success of such protective measures.…”
mentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Das Interesse an den Bedingungen, unter denen die Streitkräfte dem Regime durch (temporäre) Befehlsverweigerung die Unterstützung entzogen, wird auch durch einige Studien über die Strategien arabischer Autokraten zur Putschprävention gespiegelt (Makara 2013;Albrecht 2014a;b). Dies mag auf einen blinden Fleck der bisherigen Repressionsforschung zurückzuführen sein, die zwar unabhängig von Regimetypus konstant belegte, dass Eliten auf Bedrohung ihrer Autorität durch Proteste nahezu reflexartig mit Repression reagierten (siehe hierzu Davenport 2007, S. 7).…”
Section: Die Zukunft Des Politischen Islamunclassified