Comparing Indonesia's party systems of the 1950s and the post-Suharto era: From centrifugal to centripetal inter-party competition

Mietzner, Marcus

doi:10.1017/s0022463408000337

Cited by 68 publications

(53 citation statements)

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“…As supporters and opponents of Wahid began to mobilize, and violent clashes occurred particularly in Wahid's home province of East Java (Feillard 2002), the armed forces emerged as the only entity that could bring resolution to the conflict. Enjoying renewed attention after years of political marginalization, the military was lobbied by both Wahid and his adversaries for support (Mietzner 2006 loyalists to occupy parliament and have the military leadership arrested if it did not back him," the armed forces ultimately turned against the president and approved of his removal in July 2001. Wahid's hastily issued decree that disbanded parliament and the MPR was ignored, and Wahid's vice-president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was sworn in as his successor.…”

Section: Political Conflicts Before 2003: Mass Mobilization and Militmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the Constitutional Court

Mietzner¹

2010

Journal of East Asian Studies

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This article argues that Indonesia's Constitutional Court has played a significant role in that country's transformation from a violence-prone polity into Southeast Asia's most stable democracy. The Court has advanced institutional conflict resolution mechanisms and expanded democratic rights—two achievements identified by Linz and Stepan as major indicators of a consolidating democracy. Building on models developed by Ginsburg and Horowitz, my analysis also illustrates why the Court has been able to defend its autonomy and become an agent of democratization. While sharing Ginsburg's emphasis on high levels of power diffusion as a key reason for the Court's success, this article moves beyond such an approach. Most importantly, it suggests that the judges' “judicial activism”—as expressed in a number of controversial but popular decision—increased Indonesian society's support for the Court to such an extent that is has now become largely invulnerable to attempts of external intervention.

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Section: Political Conflicts Before 2003: Mass Mobilization and Militmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the Constitutional Court

Mietzner¹

2010

Journal of East Asian Studies

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“…Also strengthening of parliamentary political parties (ecspecially to those who are stand outside the government coalition) as the "opposition". The breakdown of party politics contributed to the downfall of parliamentary democracy and eventually helped to install Sukarno's authoritarian Guided Democracy [53].…”

Section: Recommendations On Revision Of Lawsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Law Revision on Indonesian Parliament’s Oversight Function: Facing the Challenges of Democracy

Ridlwan¹,

Nurbaningsih²

2018

KSS

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Based on the review of Indonesian Parliament's institutional history, its oversight functions existence largely determines good or poor condition of democracy and implementation of good governance principles. When it is weak or weakened, the ruling regime would tend to move away from the principles of democracy. Joko Widodo's governance conditions that tend to embrace many coalition partners in parliament, requiring revision of laws (political party and election law) in order to provide vast opportunities for the criticism measures and corrective actions from political parties, which do not collaborate with the government. Improvement of legislation should be directed to guarantee freedom of movement of political parties that do not form a coalition with the government. Therefore, those political parties can fulfill the role of a healthy opposition. Even if the parliament opposition raises have not yet to be adopted within the Indonesian governance system, at least a revision of the law aimed at guaranteeing the members of parliament (MPs) to perform their role freely according to conscience. While it cannot be separated entirely from the parties which supporting him, but the threat to be fired (recall) should be eliminated. So that MPs can still carry out the oversight role despite their political party collaborated with the government. This revision can create the oversight function of DPR as a form of real performance of a representative body to accommodate the interests of oversight of the Indonesian people, also become a reliable tool of facing the challenges of Indonesian democracy.

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“…Regime change in the mid-late 1960s resulted in the effective eradication of the left (Kammen and McGregor, 2012;Roosa, 2006). Partly as a consequence of this history, the major political parties that have competed in elections have been non-programmatic, differentiating themselves primarily by whether they are religious or nationalist (Aspinall, 2005;Mietzner, 2008;Tomsa, 2010;Ufen, 2008). In addition, several parties are dominated by Suharto-era elites; indeed, some of the newer parties were established by oligarchs as a means to defend their power and wealth (Robison and Hadiz, 2004;Winters, 2014).…”

Section: Union Cooperation In the Electoral Domainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions and collective action in divided labour movements: Evidence from Indonesia

Caraway

Ford

2017

Journal of Industrial Relations

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Under what conditions do trade unions in divided labour movements cooperate? Does cooperation in one domain increase the likelihood of cooperation in the other? Do institutions facilitate or discourage cooperation? We explore these questions through an examination of collective action across federation and confederation lines in post-Suharto Indonesia. Using a comparison of union cooperation in the policy and electoral domains, we demonstrate that tripartite wage-setting institutions have played a central role in facilitating collective action in the policy domain, encouraging unions to look beyond shop-level issues to policy issues identified by their respective national organizations as affecting workers. The relative absence of collective action across organizational divides in the electoral domain, meanwhile, can be explained by the institutional context, which creates higher barriers to unions working together.

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Comparing Indonesia's party systems of the 1950s and the post-Suharto era: From centrifugal to centripetal inter-party competition

Cited by 68 publications

References 0 publications

Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the Constitutional Court

Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the Constitutional Court

Law Revision on Indonesian Parliament’s Oversight Function: Facing the Challenges of Democracy

Institutions and collective action in divided labour movements: Evidence from Indonesia

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