Comparative Analysis: Conditions of Compliance

European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe

“…Target governments have only accepted such consequences of compliance in the "endgame" of accession negotiations, that is, when the decision of the European Union or NATO to open or conclude accession negotiations was imminent. 9 For instance, the government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus complied immediately before the referendum in 2004 that would decide the inclusion of the Republic in the European Union, and Estonia and Latvia complied with demands for minority rights just in time for accession negotiations to be opened or completed, although in each case, compliance caused coalition crises. In these situations, the (moderate) power costs of compliance were discounted against the imminent (and thus extremely credible) high benefits of membership.…”

A test of European Union post-accession influence: comparing reactions to political instability in Romania

“…5 At a general level, the alignment with the EU requirements was explained either as a rational utility calculation, and actors' pursuit of maximizing their own power, or as a more constructivist approach. 6 The latter was based on a process of social learning in which the involved actors were motivated by identities, values or norms, privileging, as such, persuasion over coercion, and complex learning rather than behavioural adaptation. 7 The literature tended to favour a rational institutionalist argument according to which there is an altered cost -benefit calculation prior to accession, and the persistence of Europeanization becomes uncertain just before or in the aftermath of accession.…”