European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe

Abstract

How and under which conditions have European regional organizations been effective promoters of democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe? In this article, the author argues that only the credible conditional promise of membership in the European Union and NATO has had the potential to produce compliance with liberal-democratic norms in norm-violating transformation countries. These incentives, however, were not sufficient when the power costs of compliance were high for the target governments. They did little to alter the policies of authoritarian governments, which forewent the benefits of accession rather than risk losing power as a result of democratic reforms. Thus, whereas political conditionality was largely redundant in the forerunner countries of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe (except for some specific reform issues) and generally ineffective with entrenched authoritarian regimes, it proved highly effective in supporting democratic forces and locking in democratic reforms in the unstable democratic countries of the region.

Institutional Convergence of the CIS Towards European Benchmarks

“…The "carrot" in this case being regional security rather than economic cooperation. Hence, it could be argued that NATO accession could have a positive effect which might be comparable to the impact of EU accession (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig 2007 andPop-Eleches 2007).…”

“…The EU's influence is also shown to be stronger in some areas, especially in economic aspects necessary to establish the single market, while it is clearly weaker in other areas like minority protection. Schimmelfennig (2007) argues that only the credible conditional promise of membership has had the potential to produce compliance with liberal-democratic norms in norm violating transformation countries. According to case studies on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, EU democratic conditionality is shown to work through a strategy of "reinforcement by reward" through intergovernmental bargaining.…”

Prospective Nato or EU Membership and Institutional Change in Transition Countries

“…The EU's influence is also shown to be stronger in some areas, especially in economic aspects necessary to establish the single market, while it is clearly weaker in other areas like minority protection. Schimmelpfennig (2007) argues that only the credible conditional promise of membership has had the potential to produce compliance with liberaldemocratic norms in norm violating transformation countries. According to case studies on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, EU democratic conditionality is shown to work through a strategy of "reinforcement by reward" through intergovernmental bargaining.…”

Regional Organisations and Mechanisms for Democracy Protection in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the European Union

“…But perhaps the most important programme was PHARE (Programme of Community Aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe). Commitment to market reforms and to democratisation were requirements for applying for the assistance of PHARE, focussed on the implementation of community regulations, the re-engineering of national budgets, infrastructure projects and the reform of administrative capacity (Pevehouse 2005;Vachudova 2005;Schimmelfennig 2007 1994). It is possible to nd a similar argument in the case of Latin America, where regional cooperation on security and defence, within the framework of the new doctrines on democratic security of the 90s, contributed to a strict separation of the civil and military spheres, which was essential for the consolidation of democratic regimes (Agüero 1995).…”

“…The accession process therefore consisted of a contract between Community institutions and domestic political elites in which on the one hand, the EU would provide the road map for obtaining membership (including the resources necessary to generate institutional change and the necessary market reforms), and, on the other hand, the domestic elites would make a commitment to implement stable democratic regimes (Pevehouse 2005;Schimmelfennig 2005Schimmelfennig , 2007.…”