Community‐based Fisheries Management, Tradition and the Challenges of Development in Marovo, Solomon Islands

Abstract

This study examines traditional fisheries‐related resource management through a case in which local communities, from a basis of customary, ‘common property’ control over the sea and its resources, handle a multitude of development issues. Presenting first some important issues relating to people's role in fisheries management and to the ‘common property’ debate, the article then describes a traditional system for management of land and sea resources in a Pacific Islands society; that of Marovo Lagoon, Solomon Islands. Emphasis is given to fisheries resources, with a view to explaining in practical terms how a system of customary marine tenure operates under the wider social, political, economic and ecological circumstances of change arising from development pressures. Against this background, assessments are made of the viability of this traditional fisheries management system under present conditions of state control and of both external and internal pressures for large‐scale resource development enterprises.

Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

“…In other settings, ceasing cooperation with rather than punishment of free-riders has also proved effective. For example, Japanese villagers, Irish fishermen and inhabitants of the Solomon islands chose to cut contact with other members of the community who were overfishing (Taylor, 1987;McKean 1992;Hviding and Baines 1994). In this way, free-riders are deprived of the benefits provided by cooperation in other economic activities.…”

Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game

“…Often, a small proportion of these altruistic punishers is sufficient to enforce cooperation in the group (Fehr and Gächter 2002). Both laboratory experiments and field studies confirm that social norms can solve a substantial number of common-pool resources management problems (Ostrom 1990;Ostrom et al 1994;Baland and Platteau 1996;McKean 1992;Hviding and Baines 1994).…”

Conditions for Sustainability of the Elephant Marsh Fishery in Malawi

“…Table 1, the sustainability of SSF at Elephant Marsh may also depend on several other factors in addition to a good collective social capital at resource level. For example the presence (or absence) of government officers and the leadership of local chiefs in conflict resolution mechanisms can either be positive if they uphold the roles of local fisheries management committees or negative if they calculatedly take a more "power defending" position (conflictive interference) [35,47]. Conflictive interference may consequently bring administrative difficulties and social divisions at resource level [6,17,46].…”