Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game

Noailly, Joëlle; Bergh, J.C.J.M. van den; Withagen, Cees

doi:10.2139/ssrn.740164

Cited by 12 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 30 publications

(15 reference statements)

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“…Noailly et al [43,44] extend Sethi & Somanathan's model by embedding it on a network. They find coexistence of all three strategies when sanctions are imposed locally on neighbours.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

2016

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Sustainable use of common-pool resources such as fish, water or forests depends on the cooperation of resource users that restrain their individual extraction to socially optimal levels. Empirical evidence has shown that under certain social and biophysical conditions, self-organized cooperation in the commons can evolve. Global change, however, may drastically alter these conditions. We assess the robustness of cooperation to environmental variability in a stylized model of a community that harvests a shared resource. Community members follow a norm of socially optimal resource extraction, which is enforced through social sanctioning. Our results indicate that both resource abundance and a small increase in resource variability can lead to collapse of cooperation observed in the no-variability case, while either scarcity or large variability have the potential to stabilize it. The combined effects of changes in amount and variability can reinforce or counteract each other depending on their size and the initial level of cooperation in the community. If two socially separate groups are ecologically connected through resource leakage, cooperation in one can destabilize the other. These findings provide insights into possible effects of global change and spatial connectivity, indicating that there is no simple answer as to their effects on cooperation and sustainable resource use.

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“…Noailly et al [43,44] extend Sethi & Somanathan's model by embedding it on a network. They find coexistence of all three strategies when sanctions are imposed locally on neighbours.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

2016

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“…A number of two-dimensional models have been studied in the economic literature (Barr & Tassier, 2010;Kirchkamp, 1999Kirchkamp, , 2000Noailly et al, 2009;Outkin, 2003;Tieman et al, 2000;Wilhite, 2006). The models of Kirchkamp (2000) and Tieman et al (2000) are the ones that are most closely related to our model.…”

Section: Two-dimensional Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Model of Price Competition Among Spatially Distributed Firms

2013

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Various studies have shown the emergence of cooperative behavior in evolutionary models with spatially distributed agents. We investigate to what extent these findings generalize to evolutionary models of price competition among spatially distributed firms. We consider both one-and twodimensional models, and we vary the amount of information firms have about competitors in their neighborhood. Our computer simulations show that the emergence of cooperative behavior depends strongly on the amount of information available to firms. Firms tend to behave most cooperatively if they have only a very limited amount of information about their competitors. We provide an intuitive explanation for this phenomenon. Our simulations further indicate that three other factors in our models, namely the accuracy of firms' information, the probability of experimentation, and the spatial distribution of consumers, have little effect on the emergence of cooperative behavior.

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“…So far, no group selection argument has been used in this literature, although the evolution of institutions has received ample attention in the context of common-pool resources (Noailly et al, 2007(Noailly et al, , 2009Sethi and Somanathan, 1996). A central question is whether resource conflicts and overuse should be addressed by strict policies set by higher-level governments, or instead by relying on the endogenous formation of use regimes.…”

Section: Group Selection and Common Pool Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Noailly et al (2009) show that local equilibria consist of a protection layer of M a n u s c r i p t 19 enforcers. In view of the foregoing it is surprising that the literature on local interactions with evolutionary agent-based modeling does not make reference to group selection.…”

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confidence: 99%

A group selection perspective on economic behavior, institutions and organizations

Bergh

Gowdy

2009

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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NutzungsbedingungenThis is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 1 AbstractThis article examines the role of group dynamics and interactions in explaining economic behavior and the evolution of institutions. Our starting point is the large literature on group selection in the biological, behavioral and social sciences. We present a range of interpretations of group selection, describe a complete set of group selection mechanisms, and discuss the empirical and experimental evidence for group selection. Unique features of cultural group selection are investigated, and opportunities for applying the latter to various areas of economic theory and economic policy are identified.

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Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game

Cited by 12 publications

References 30 publications

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

An Evolutionary Model of Price Competition Among Spatially Distributed Firms

A group selection perspective on economic behavior, institutions and organizations

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