Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results

A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk

“…When a desirable outcome requires symmetry-breaking, one-sided communication is much more effective than two-sided communication, with coordination frequencies of 95 0 in Battle of the Sexes (almost always on the Sender's favorite equilibrium), versus 550 with two-sided communication and 410 with no communication [9,10,11]. With two-sided communication, multiple rounds are more effective than one round, with coordination frequencies of 63 0 versus 550 [9], but these stop well short of yielding efficiency.…”

“…With two-sided communication, multiple rounds are more effective than one round, with coordination frequencies of 63 0 versus 550 [9], but these stop well short of yielding efficiency. These results are very close to predictions based on Farrell's [18,19] analyses.…”

“…It is intriguing to compare the results of [9,10,11] with those of the experimental study of``0-sided'' communication in Van Huyck, Gilette, and Battalio [38], in which subjects were not allowed to communicate but were given a public, nonbinding suggestion about which equilibrium to play. Suggestions of one of three isomorphic, symmetric, and efficient equilibria were very effective, with a coordination rate of 980 versus 40 0 without a suggestion; but suggestions of inefficient or``unfair'' equilibria were far less effective, with coordination rates of 17 25 0 and 160 respectively.…”

“…Costa Gomes [12] reconsidered the evidence from the experiments of [32,33] and the evidence on structured communication from [9,11], examining data from the entire samples and using Rabin's [30,31] notion of negotiated rationalizability. The power of Rabin's approach depends on imposing empirically sensible restrictions on players' strategies.…”

Introduction to Experimental Game Theory

“…or to subjects having ''social'' preferences that EXPERIMENTAL GAME THEORY respond to the perceived fairness of outcomes as well as pecuniary payoffs. 9 Most researchers now agree that both factors are significant, but their relative importance has been hard to determine.…”