Introduction to Experimental Game Theory

Crawford, Vincent P.

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2909

Cited by 24 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 35 publications

(32 reference statements)

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“…We experimentally investigate the effects of costless pre-play communication, or cheap talk, in symmetric coordination games of the stag hunt variety [11][12][13][14][15]. Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (VHBB) [33,34] demonstrate that in so-called Minimum and Median games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, the Pareto-efficient equilibria need not be selected, and in fact typically are not selected [7,Chapter 7.4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria

Blume

Ortmann

2007

Journal of Economic Theory

273

165

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Cheap talk is shown to facilitate coordination on the unique efficient equilibrium in experimental order-statistic games. This result is roughly consistent with theoretical predictions according to which cheap talk promotes efficient Nash play. The evidence concerning the mechanisms that theory appeals to is mixed: Frequent agreement of messages and actions is consistent with messages being viewed as self-committing. Risk in the underlying game and the absence of self-signaling messages may explain why message profiles are not unanimous. Time-varying message profiles can be interpreted as evidence for players trying to negotiate equilibria and/or trying to rely on secret handshakes.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria

Blume

Ortmann

2007

Journal of Economic Theory

273

165

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…O experimentador submete indivíduos a decisões reais e não apenas a hipotéticas. O uso dos experimentos como estratégia metodológica permite realizar inferências acerca do comportamento dos agentes, lançando luz sobre elementos influenciadores do processo decisório que, muitas vezes, não são reconhecidos ou considerados pelos agentes (Crawford, 2002). Eckel e Grossman (2008) esclarecem que a economia comportamental se diferencia da tradicional por considerar os efeitos sistemáticos de fatores como raça e gênero sobre o processo decisório.…”

Section: A Economia Comportamental E O Jogo Do Ultimatounclassified

A Influência do Gênero no Processo Decisório: O Jogo do Ultimato

et al. 2017

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Resumo Este artigo analisa as diferenças de gênero no processo decisório por meio de uma abordagem metodológica ainda pouco utilizada no Brasil, embora reconhecida pela academia internacional: o experimento econômico, mais especificamente o Jogo do Ultimato, que pertence ao escopo da Teoria dos Jogos. A condução desse experimento envolveu 320 participantes divididos em 5 subgrupos moderados pelo gênero. Os resultados mostraram que, no processo de interação entre indivíduos, a função utilidade deve ser compreendida não apenas com base na premissa da maximização dos resultados econômicos, mas levar em conta as preferências sociais do indivíduo. Assim, um dos principais achados foi identificar maior propensão masculina à rejeição de propostas advindas de mulheres, não obstante serem essas propostas comparativamente mais generosas. Além disso, foi observado que as mulheres tendem a ser mais generosas em suas ofertas em comparação aos homens. Tais achados são inéditos para o Brasil e podem ser um indicador da influência do gênero sobre o processo decisório, com importantes repercussões para o ambiente organizacional.

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“…The puzzle is how did they learn enough about the effectiveness of their alternative repeated game strategies to play the efficient stage-game equilibrium? In Crawford (2002), I suggested that Van Huyck et al's results might be explained by a strategic teaching model like that of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2002), in which some players are adaptive learners while others are forward-looking and sophisticated in the sense of best responding to the correct mixture of adaptive and sophisticated subjects.…”

Section: Coordination and Cooperation In Long-term Relationshipsmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships

Crawford

2016

Journal of Economic Perspectives

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In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory's principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking” and “learning” rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments

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Introduction to Experimental Game Theory

Cited by 24 publications

References 35 publications

The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria

The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria

A Influência do Gênero no Processo Decisório: O Jogo do Ultimato

New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships

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