Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information

Abstract

We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players' preferences. We consider two players who vote on forming a partnership with uncertain rewards. It may or may not be worthwhile to team up. Both players want to make the right decision but differ in their attitudes toward making an error. Players' preferences are private information and each player is partially informed about the state of the world. Before voting, players can talk to each other.We completely characterize the equilibria and show that the main role of communica-tion is to provide a double check: When there is a conflict between a player's preferences and her private information about the state, she votes in accordance with her private information only if it is confirmed by the message she receives from her opponent. In a scenario where only one of the players is allowed to talk, the benefits of communication are independent of the identity of the sender. AbstractWe analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players' preferences. We consider two players who vote on forming a partnership with uncertain rewards. It may or may not be worthwhile to team up. Both players want to make the right decision but differ in their attitudes toward making an error. Players' preferences are private information and each player is partially informed about the state of the world. Before voting, players can talk to each other.We completely characterize the equilibria and show that the main role of communication is to provide a double check: When there is a conflict between a player's preferences and her private information about the state, she votes in accordance with her private information only if it is confirmed by the message she receives from her opponent. In a scenario where only one of the players is allowed to talk, the benefits of communication are independent of the identity of the sender.

Deliberation and Voting Rules

“…Depending on individual attitudes toward the common interests and on the information structure, deliberation can be fully informative under majority rule but not under unanimity. 15 1 5 A similar impossibility result is proved by Doraszelski, Gerardi and Squintani (2001), the only other model that, to the best of our knowledge, considers deliberation under unanimity rule. DGS study a two-person committee that is choosing between a status quo and a given alternative policy; rejection of the status quo requires unanimous approval.…”

“…In addition to Gerardi and Yariv (2002), to the best of our knowledge the only contributions are Doraszelski, Gerardi and Squintani (2001) who study a two-person unanimity problem in which both agents are known to share identical preferences conditional on full information; Coughlan (2000) who explicitly includes a cheap talk communication stage to the standard strategic model of voting in juries; Calvert and Johnson (1998) who explore a coordination role for cheap talk; and Austen-Smith (1990a, 1990b) who analyses a model of deliberative committee decision making with endogenous agenda-setting.…”

The Value of Information in the Court - Get it Right, Keep it Tight

“…This makes truthful revelation of information more difficult, as is illustrated in the analysis of Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005), and Austen- Smith and Feddersen (2006). (See also Li, Rosen, and Suen 2001;and Doraszelski, Gerardi, and Squintani 2003. ) Here we take an empirical perspective on the issue.…”

To elect or to appoint? Bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians

“…While the incentive to do so is small when interests are well aligned (Coughlan (2000)), this is not the case when there is (interim) disagreement, as in the setting consider here. This makes truthful revelation of information more difficult, as is illustrated in the analysis of AustenSmith and Feddersen (2005Feddersen ( , 2006) (see also Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001) and Doraszelski, Gerardi, and Squintani (2003)). 12 Visser and Swank (2007) consider pre-vote deliberation when committee members want to signal their ability to a principal.…”