Deliberation and Voting Rules

Austen‐Smith, David; Feddersen, Timothy

doi:10.1007/3-540-27295-x_11

Cited by 65 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(16 reference statements)

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“…This enables the deductive determination of what deliberation will look like in a particular environment subject to the condition that the external assumptions are true. This approach suggests two directions for analysis—varying the external assumptions, holding fixed the description of the environment (e.g., Dickson, Hafer, and Landa 2008a; Hafer and Landa 2007), and varying the description of the environment, holding fixed the external assumptions (e.g., Austen‐Smith and Feddersen 2005, 2006; Dickson, Hafer, and Landa 2008b; Meirowitz 2006, 2007). The analysis of deliberation as environment, thus, does not require that the external assumptions conform to a particular a priori fixed notion of rationality, though the debate about which behavioral agency is appropriate for which deliberative environments in the game‐theoretic work is still nascent (Landa 2006).…”

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Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy

Landa

Meirowitz

2009

American J Political Sci

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We contend that, with a suitably broad notion of rationality and a diverse set of motivations, the game-theoretic tradition is particularly well suited for generating insights about effects of deliberative institutions and that progress in the development of deliberative democratic theory hinges on making proper sense of the relationship between game-theoretic and normative theoretic approaches to deliberation. To advance this view, we explore the central methodological issues at the core of that relationship and address the arguments raised against the relevance of game-theoretic work on deliberation. We develop a framework for thinking about the differences in how the normative and the game-theoretic approaches frame and answer questions about deliberation and articulate an approach to a deliberative democratic theory that builds on the strengths of both of these theoretic traditions, properly informed by empirical scholarship. D emocracy is minimally defined as a form of governance in which policy decisions are made by a majority vote of the citizens. While useful as a rough way of classifying polities, this definition is, on closer examination, both ambiguous and radically incomplete. The main thrust of the critique of minimal democracy developed in contemporary democratic theory is that voting is not the best, or at least not the only, political mechanism for ensuring that policy decisions conform to the interests of the citizens. A key political mechanism that also serves that role and that is missing from the minimalist view of democracy is deliberation, and the appreciation of the effects of this mechanism is changing the way scholars of democracy think about democratic institutions.In revealing correct, fuller, or simply better organized information, deliberation provides an opportunity for participants to arrive at more considered judgments themselves and to affect collective decision making by influencing the judgments of others. Its consequences may affect

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confidence: 99%

Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy

Landa

Meirowitz

2009

American J Political Sci

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“…Austen‐Smith and Feddersen () make a distinction between deliberation and debate . In the former, two or more privately informed agents engage in cheap talk prior to arriving at a collective decision via a voting rule ; in the latter, the cheap talk communication simply precedes some decision being made .…”

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confidence: 99%

“…See Austen‐Smith and Feddersen ( or ), Gerardi and Yariv (), and Meirowitz (). Notable departures from the cheap talk framework are Hafer and Landa () and Dickson et al.…”

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Engagement, Disengagement, or Exit: A Theory of Equilibrium Associations

Penn

2015

American J Political Sci

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This article considers the possibility of mutually beneficial communication among groups when any group may choose to unilaterally join or exit an alliance. My main concern is the trade-off groups face between the informational benefits of associating with others in a large society versus the costs imposed by power sharing and preference diversity. When these costs are sufficiently high, groups may prefer exit to association. The results of this article characterize the associations of groups that can be sustained in equilibrium, and within those associations, the types of groups that choose to meaningfully communicate with others. The results demonstrate that there can be benefits or costs associated with the inclusion of preference extremists in a diverse society, whether or not those extremists choose to actively communicate with outgroups. The results also speak to institutional mechanisms for fostering communication across diverse groups.

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