Common Property Aspects of Ground-Water Use and Drainage Generation

Dixon, Lloyd S.

doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-4028-1_34

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In the water realm, most applications are found in the groundwater literature -even though players' strategic interactions and the process of negotiation are often not treated with the due importance. An attempt in this direction has been made by Dixon (1999) who models a simplified version of 5 The Gisser-Sanchez effect rests mainly on the theoretical assumption of very steep groundwater use benefit curves (implying relative price insensitiveness of users). For a recent criticism of the Gisser-Sanchez effect see, for instance, Koundouri (2004).…”

Section: Ground Water Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory

2007

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The purpose of this paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water management problems. The interest in this subject stems from two considerations: (i) water resources continue to be mismanaged, despite their recognized importance for sustainable development, in particular in developing countries; (ii) negotiated decision making has the potential to improve water management, yet there is still little formal understanding of the forces driving bargaining processes, and applications of formal negotiation theory to water issues are also lacking. This paper surveys the existing non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water management problems, with the purpose of preliminarily assessing whether such a formal approach in the phase of problem exploration and policy formulation can support decision makers in the real world. It is the contention of this paper that the proposed approach may offer direct and indirect support by: shortening the time needed to reach an agreement through the (theoretical) identification of an ‘acceptability space’, and helping select policies which are self-enforcing and, therefore, acceptable.

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Section: Ground Water Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory

2007

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“…Esteban and Dinar [] used a cooperative game theory framework to evaluate the value of cooperation in groundwater management, accounting for externalities on both the environment and other users' pumping costs. Generally, game theoretical models of groundwater exploitation represent shared aquifers as bath tubs, where changes in water levels are immediately disseminated to all users [ Negri , ; Gardner et al ., ; Rubio and Casino , ; Nakao et al ., ; Esteban and Dinar , ], or assume extremely idealized groundwater flow systems [ Loáiciga , ; Madani and Dinar , ; Dixon , ] or well‐field layouts [ Saak and Peterson , ; Saleh et al ., ; Saak and Peterson , ]. The three latter studies have shown that the hydrogeological characteristics of the aquifer and the spatial layout of the wells strongly affect common‐pool overdraft.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Jordan and Saudi Arabia are avoiding a tragedy of the commons over shared groundwater

Müller

Müller-Itten

Gorelick

2017

Water Resources Research

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Transboundary aquifers are ubiquitous and strategically important to global food and water security. Yet these shared resources are being depleted at an alarming rate. Focusing on the Disi aquifer, a key nonrenewable source of groundwater shared by Jordan and Saudi Arabia, this study develops a two‐stage game that evaluates optimal transboundary strategies of common‐pool resource exploitation under various assumptions. The analysis relies on estimates of agricultural water use from satellite imagery, which were obtained using three independent remote sensing approaches. Drawdown response to pumping is simulated using a 2‐D regional aquifer model. Jordan and Saudi Arabia developed a buffer‐zone strategy with a prescribed minimum distance between each country's pumping centers. We show that by limiting the marginal impact of pumping decisions on the other country's pumping costs, this strategy will likely avoid an impeding tragedy of the commons for at least 60 years. Our analysis underscores the role played by distance between wells and disparities in groundwater exploitation costs on common‐pool overdraft. In effect, if pumping centers are distant enough, a shared aquifer no longer behaves as a common‐pool resource and a tragedy of the commons can be avoided. The 2015 Disi aquifer pumping agreement between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which in practice relies on a joint technical commission to enforce exclusion zones, is the first agreement of this type between sovereign countries and has a promising potential to avoid conflicts or resolve potential transboundary groundwater disputes over comparable aquifer systems elsewhere.

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“…However, we can assume that there is a limit to the correlation between the environmental benefits generated and the increase of the stock. Too much increase in wetland may cause floods, which generate environmental and agricultural costs (see, for example, Dixon, 1991 or Tsur, 1991). In addition, there is a pumping cost externality as extraction cost is stock dependent (Provencher and Burt, 1993).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Potential Conflict and Inefficiencies Arising in Agri‐environmental Management

Martin¹,

Stahn²

2012

J Agricultural Economics

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ACL-3International audienceWe characterise the welfare implications of uncoordinated policy decisions in the presence of multiple externalities, illustrated with an aquifer. We concentrate on the problem of coordination that can occur when distinct agricultural and water authorities implement their respective policies (to optimise food production and groundwater use) with environmental concerns in mind. We represent this problem as an open-loop Nash game, which compares the game-theoretical solution to a centrally planned solution. We show that the inefficiencies arise from differences in the account taken of relevant costs by different authorities. We demonstrate that the magnitude of the inefficiency generated by the absence of coordination of our authorities varies depending on the weights put on environmental benefits by each authority, and discuss the implications of analysis for future research and policy

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Common Property Aspects of Ground-Water Use and Drainage Generation

Cited by 7 publications

References 9 publications

Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory

Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory

How Jordan and Saudi Arabia are avoiding a tragedy of the commons over shared groundwater

Potential Conflict and Inefficiencies Arising in Agri‐environmental Management

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