Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory

Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen; Sgobbi, Alessandra

doi:10.1017/s1355770x06003536

Cited by 54 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…This result of the simulation exercise is in line with both the theoretical findings of non-cooperative bargaining theory and the applications of non-cooperative bargaining models to water negotiations (see Carraro et al, 2005, andCarraro et al, 2007). Furthermore, more iterations are needed before a limit point equilibrium solution is found, indicating the increased difficulties in finding a compromise allocation.…”

Section: Sensitivity Analysissupporting

confidence: 79%

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Carraro¹,

Sgobbi²

2007

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process -asymmetries and uncertainties in particular -by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players' optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on players' strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects players' behaviour and modifies the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite size are increasing. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Sensitivity Analysissupporting

confidence: 79%

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Carraro¹,

Sgobbi²

2007

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

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“…On the territory of i, rainfall 1 The standard approach to analyse river sharing problems is to apply non-cooperative game-theoretic models (cf. Carraro et al 2007;Ansink and Ruijs 2008). The merit of the axiomatic approach employed in this paper is to complement, support and improve our understanding of the outcomes of these strategic models.…”

Section: The River Sharing Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second example is the river sharing problem (Ambec and Sprumont 2002;Parrachino et al 2006;Carraro et al 2007;Ambec and Ehlers 2008). This is the topic of this paper.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Ansink

Weikard

2011

Soc Choice Welf

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We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise the class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, provide two characterisations of one specific rule, and compare sequential sharing rules with three alternative solutions to the river sharing problem.

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“…The second example is the river sharing problem (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002;Parrachino et al, 2006;Carraro et al, 2007). This is the topic of this paper.…”

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confidence: 99%

Sequential Sharing Rules for River Sharing Problems

Ansink

Weikard²

2010

SSRN Journal

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SummaryWe analyse the redistribution of a resource among agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise a class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, and compare them to four alternative solutions to the river sharing problem. Keywords AbstractWe analyse the redistribution of a resource among agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of twoagent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise a class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, and compare them to four alternative solutions to the river sharing problem.

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Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory

Cited by 54 publications

References 29 publications

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Sequential Sharing Rules for River Sharing Problems

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