Commodity Taxes Under Fiscal Competition: Stackelberg Equilibrium and Optimality

You-qiang, Wang

doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.974

Cited by 78 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…2 See Breuckner (2003) for an overview of the empirical literature on tax reaction functions. 3 Key contributions are those of Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Kanbur and Keen (1993), Lockwood (1993), Trandel (1994), Haufler (1996), Ohsawa (1999), Wang (1999), Nielsen (2001Nielsen ( , 2002, Ohsawa (2003Ohsawa ( , 2004, and Ohsawa and Koshizuka (2003). Wilson (1999) provides an overview of the tax competition literature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States

Jacobs

Ligthart

Vrijburg

2009

Int Tax Public Finance

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The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that estimates tax reaction functions of governments competing with other governments. We analyze consumption tax competition between US states, employing a panel of state-level data for . More specifically, we study the impact of a state's spatial characteristics (i.e., its size, geographic position, and border length) on the strategic interaction with its neighbors. For this purpose, we calculate for each state an average effective consumption tax rate, which covers both sales and excise taxes. In addition, we pay attention to dynamics by including lagged dependent variables in the tax reaction function. We find overwhelming evidence for strategic interaction among state governments, but only partial support for the effect of spatial characteristics on tax setting. Tax competition seems to have lessened in the 1990s compared to the early 1980s.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States

Jacobs

Ligthart

Vrijburg

2009

Int Tax Public Finance

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“…The commodity tax equilibria in Kanbur and Keen (1993), Trandel (1994), Hau°er (1996) and are Nash equilibria, while Wang (1999) and Hvidt and Nielsen (2001) If cross-border trade is to run from the small to the large country as posited, then the large country must have the smaller tax, T < t, implying from (8) and (9) that…”

Section: Mcpfs and The Direction Of Cross-border Shoppingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the famous model by Kanbur and Keen (1993) as well as in subsequent work by Trandel (1994), Wang (1999) and , cross-border shopping is modelled in a two-country framework with some size asymmetry between the two countries. In Kanbur and Keen's model as well as those of Trandel and Wang one country has a bigger population density; in Nielsen's model, one country is larger than the other in geographical extent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-border shopping from small to large countries

Nielsen

2002

Economics Letters

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“…In the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the tax rate of the smaller country is lower than the tax rate in the larger country, with the tax revenue being higher in the larger country. Subsequent studies have also focused on di¤erences between countries, in population size (Trandel 1994;Wang 1999) or geographical size (Ohsawa 1999;Nielsen 2001Nielsen , 2002 1 . Aiura & Ogawa (2013) examine the choice between ad valorem tax and unit tax.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-Border or Online - Tax Competition with Mobile Consumers Under Destination and Origin Principle

Birg

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis paper studies the e¤ect of an online retailer on spatial tax competition with mobile consumers. If taxation for online purchases follows the destination principle, the entry of the online retailer mitigates tax competition; if taxation for online purchases follows the origin principle, the entry of the online retailer enhances tax competition. Lower cost of online shopping enhances the e¤ect of the online retailer on tax competition, limited internet access decreases the e¤ect of the online retailer on tax competition. For su¢ciently low cost of online shopping, welfare in the country where the online retailer is located is higher under the origin principle and welfare in the other country is higher under the destination principle. Total welfare is higher under the destination principle.JEL Classi…cation: F12, H20, L13

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Commodity Taxes Under Fiscal Competition: Stackelberg Equilibrium and Optimality

Cited by 78 publications

References 8 publications

Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States

Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States

Cross-border shopping from small to large countries

Cross-Border or Online - Tax Competition with Mobile Consumers Under Destination and Origin Principle

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