Cross-border shopping from small to large countries

Nielsen, Søren Bo

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00141-6

Cited by 33 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The revenue maximization assumption is discussed at length in Kanbur and Keen (1993). Nielsen (2002) assumes governments maximize consumer surplus plus revenue; Agrawal (2012) considers welfare maximizing governments when states can levy geographically decentralized tax rates. 8 All of the action is with consumers who decide where to make their "single" purchase.…”

Section: Equilibrium With Three Heterogeneous Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Tax Gradient: Spatial Aspects of Fiscal Competition

Agrawal

2015

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. State borders create a discontinuous tax treatment of retail sales. In a Nash game, local tax rates will be higher on the low-state-tax side of a border. Local taxes will decrease from the nearest high-tax border and increase from the low-tax border. Using driving time from state borders and all local sales tax rates, local tax rates on the low-tax side of the border are 1.25 percentage points higher, reducing the differential in state tax rates by over three-quarters. A ten minute increase in driving time from the nearest high-tax state lowers a border town's local tax rate by 6%. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: H200, H250, H730, H770, R510.

show abstract

Section: Equilibrium With Three Heterogeneous Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Tax Gradient: Spatial Aspects of Fiscal Competition

Agrawal

2015

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…4 See Braid (1993Braid ( , 2000, Cremer and Ghavari (2000), Lucus (2004), Nielsen (2001Nielsen ( , 2002, Ohsawa (1999Ohsawa ( , 2003, Koshizuka (2003), andWang (1999). See also Leal et al (2010) for an extensive summary of tax competition analyses of cross-border shopping.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unit tax versus ad valorem tax: A tax competition model with cross-border shopping

Aiura¹,

Ogawa²

2013

Journal of Public Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWithin the framework of spatial tax competition with cross-border shopping, we examine the choice of tax method between ad valorem tax and unit (specific) tax. The paper shows that governments endogenously choose ad valorem tax not because of a classic welfare reason, but because it is a good strategy in competing for mobile customers. Another key finding is that while governments are committed to the ad valorem tax method, the choice is not efficient; Tax-cutting competition becomes more serious when countries adopt ad valorem tax, and competition in ad valorem tax yields smaller payoffs than competition in unit tax.

show abstract

“…2 See Breuckner (2003) for an overview of the empirical literature on tax reaction functions. 3 Key contributions are those of Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Kanbur and Keen (1993), Lockwood (1993), Trandel (1994), Haufler (1996), Ohsawa (1999), Wang (1999), Nielsen (2001Nielsen ( , 2002, Ohsawa (2003Ohsawa ( , 2004, and Ohsawa and Koshizuka (2003). Wilson (1999) provides an overview of the tax competition literature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States

Jacobs

Ligthart

Vrijburg

2009

Int Tax Public Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that estimates tax reaction functions of governments competing with other governments. We analyze consumption tax competition between US states, employing a panel of state-level data for . More specifically, we study the impact of a state's spatial characteristics (i.e., its size, geographic position, and border length) on the strategic interaction with its neighbors. For this purpose, we calculate for each state an average effective consumption tax rate, which covers both sales and excise taxes. In addition, we pay attention to dynamics by including lagged dependent variables in the tax reaction function. We find overwhelming evidence for strategic interaction among state governments, but only partial support for the effect of spatial characteristics on tax setting. Tax competition seems to have lessened in the 1990s compared to the early 1980s.

show abstract

Cross-border shopping from small to large countries

Cited by 33 publications

References 5 publications

The Tax Gradient: Spatial Aspects of Fiscal Competition

The Tax Gradient: Spatial Aspects of Fiscal Competition

Unit tax versus ad valorem tax: A tax competition model with cross-border shopping

Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About