2020
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-020-00439-9
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Commitment, Norm-Governedness and Guidance

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Independently from the debate on how to formulate the truth norm of belief, a group of normativists have suggested we conceive of belief as cognitive commitment (Baldwin, 2007;Bilgrami, 2004;Brandom, 1994;Coliva, 2015;Kazemi, 2020Kazemi, , 2021Kazemi, , 2022aLevi, 2002;Millar, 2004;Moran, 2001;Tebben, 2018). According to them, to believe that p is to undertake a commitment to the truth of p. 8 Just as we have three doxastic attitudes towards a proposition (belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief), we may undertake a commitment to the truth of p, undertake a commitment to the falsity of p, or remain noncommitted to the truth or falsity of p. These normativists have different reasons to adopt such a view.…”
Section: Preliminary Remarksmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Independently from the debate on how to formulate the truth norm of belief, a group of normativists have suggested we conceive of belief as cognitive commitment (Baldwin, 2007;Bilgrami, 2004;Brandom, 1994;Coliva, 2015;Kazemi, 2020Kazemi, , 2021Kazemi, , 2022aLevi, 2002;Millar, 2004;Moran, 2001;Tebben, 2018). According to them, to believe that p is to undertake a commitment to the truth of p. 8 Just as we have three doxastic attitudes towards a proposition (belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief), we may undertake a commitment to the truth of p, undertake a commitment to the falsity of p, or remain noncommitted to the truth or falsity of p. These normativists have different reasons to adopt such a view.…”
Section: Preliminary Remarksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Independently from the debate on how to formulate the truth norm of belief, a group of normativists have suggested we conceive of belief as cognitive commitment (Baldwin, 2007; Bilgrami, 2004; Brandom, 1994; Coliva, 2015; Kazemi, 2020, 2021, 2022a; Levi, 2002; Millar, 2004; Moran, 2001; Tebben, 2018). According to them, to believe that p is to undertake a commitment to the truth of p .…”
Section: Belief As Cognitive Commitmentmentioning
confidence: 99%