Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology

Kazemi, Alireza

doi:10.1080/13869795.2021.1963820

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Independently from the debate on how to formulate the truth norm of belief, a group of normativists have suggested we conceive of belief as cognitive commitment (Baldwin, 2007;Bilgrami, 2004;Brandom, 1994;Coliva, 2015;Kazemi, 2020Kazemi, , 2021Kazemi, , 2022aLevi, 2002;Millar, 2004;Moran, 2001;Tebben, 2018). According to them, to believe that p is to undertake a commitment to the truth of p. 8 Just as we have three doxastic attitudes towards a proposition (belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief), we may undertake a commitment to the truth of p, undertake a commitment to the falsity of p, or remain noncommitted to the truth or falsity of p. These normativists have different reasons to adopt such a view.…”

Section: Preliminary Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Belief As Cognitive Commitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The norms of belief as the norms of commitment: A case for pluralism

Kazemi

2023

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Much of the discussion on the normativity of belief rests on the presupposition that there is a single fundamental truth norm governing belief that explains all of its normative features. Building on the committive conception of belief proposed by some normativists, this article takes issue with this presupposition. In particular, it is argued that belief, construed as cognitive commitment, is governed by three fundamental‐cum‐irreducible norms, which I call the “entitlement norm,” the “fulfillment norm” and the “escapability norm,” and it is shown that each of them concerns a particular normative feature of belief. Taken together, these norms can explain all the normative features of belief without leading to implausible consequences. The discussion also shows that the relationship between the truth norm and the evidence norm is more complicated than is usually conceded by normativists.

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