Commitment and Dependency in Marriage

Nock, Steven L.

doi:10.2307/353702

Cited by 69 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…In traditional economic and sociological models, higher levels of education and earnings potential among women destabilises unions, because of the lower specialisation gains to marriage, and the lower degree of female dependence on the spouse (e.g., Becker 1991;Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977;Nock 1995). This effect would be greatest in educationally homogamous unions, or unions in which women have higher levels of education than their husbands.…”

Section: Education Homogamy and Union Stabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Family life in power couples.

Dribe¹,

Stanfors²

2010

DemRes

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Section: Education Homogamy and Union Stabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Family life in power couples.

Dribe¹,

Stanfors²

2010

DemRes

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“…In contrast to theoretical approaches that focus on selection, some authors have emphasized that differences in the money management strategies of cohabiters and spouses might also be explained by inherent differences between cohabitation and marriage (Brines and Joyner 1999;Brown and Booth 1996;Nock 1995;Poortman and Mills 2012). Often, differences in the commitment of married and cohabiting unions have been highlighted.…”

Section: Explanations Focusing On Inherent Differences Of Cohabitatiomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Often, differences in the commitment of married and cohabiting unions have been highlighted. Marriage is a symbol of long-term commitment because it is highly institutionalized (Nock 1995). Marriage is a public affirmation that implies specific norms, obligations, and formal ties, and leads to "enforceable trust" (Cherlin 2004).…”

Section: Explanations Focusing On Inherent Differences Of Cohabitatiomentioning

confidence: 99%

Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples

Hiekel¹,

Liefbroer²,

Poortman³

2014

DemRes

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“…Yet another perspective regarding the positive effect of women's economic activity on divorce can be found in Nock's (1995Nock's ( , 2001) equal dependency hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, equally dependent spouses, in which each of the partners generates 40 to 59 % of the family earnings, will have the highest probability of divorce, because the women in these couples have the lowest degree of commitment to marriage.…”

Section: Women's Economic Activity As a Destabilizing Factor For Marrmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some of them suggest that wives' economic activity has a destabilizing effect on marriage (Becker 1991;Brines 1994;Lundberg and Pollak 1996;Manser and Brown 1980;Nock 1995Nock , 2001Parsons 1940), while other theoretical perspectives assert that it has a stabilizing effect (Cherlin 2000;Moffitt 2000;Oppenheimer 1977;Rogers 2004). Each of these groups of theories is based on different underlying assumptions regarding the existence of asymmetry or symmetry between the spouses.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Determinants of Divorce Among Dual-Earner Couples: Jews in Israel

Raz-Yurovich

2012

Eur J Population

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The second half of the twentieth century saw tremendous changes in the economics of the household, as women entered the labor force in growing numbers and the share of dual-earners couples increased. These changes challenge the available theories which explain divorce by economic factors, as they are mostly molded in the homemaker-breadwinner model. In this study, we investigate the validity of two main groups of theories: one which asserts that women's work has a destabilizing effect on marriage, and assumes asymmetry between the spouses; and another which states that women's employment has a stabilizing effect, and assumes that relations between spouses are symmetric. By employing a large-scale longitudinal register-based data for the Jewish population in Israel, we find asymmetry in the effect of the spouses' economic characteristics on marital instability, which suggest that theories that assert asymmetry and power relations between the spouses better explain transition to divorce among this group. In line with theories of income pooling, higher shared salaries are found to increase marital stability. Nonetheless, our results demonstrate that the basic assumption of symmetry between the spouses in these theories does not hold. Although employment stability for both spouses appears to reduce divorce risk, only the husband's salary is shown to negatively affect the odds of divorce and only the wife's working hours and sector of employment affect marriage instability. Moreover, couples in which the wife earns as much as or more than the husband are found to have the highest divorce risk. Résumé Des changements considérables ont été observés dans la situation économique des ménages au cours de la seconde moitié du 20e siècle avec l'entrée croissante des femmes sur le marché du travail et l'augmentation de la proportion de couples bi-actifs. Ces changements interpellent les théories existantes qui mettent en avant les facteurs économiques pour expliquer le divorce, car elles s'inscrivent dans le modèle personne au foyer -soutien de famille. Dans cet article, nous examinons la validité des deux principaux groupes de théories : le premier qui affirme que le travail des femmes est un facteur de déstabilisation du mariage et suppose une asymétrie entre conjoints, le second qui postule que le travail des femmes est un facteur de stabilisation et se base sur l'hypothèse que les relations entre conjoints sont symétriques. A partir de données longitudinales de registres concernant une large partie de la population juive en Israël, une asymétrie dans l'effet des caractéristiques économiques des conjoints sur l'instabilité conjugale est observée, ce qui laisse supposer que les théories qui considèrent une asymétrie et des relations de pouvoir entre les conjoints expliquent mieux la survenue du divorce dans ce groupe. Conformément à la théorie de mise en commun des revenus, des salaires partagés plus élevés augmentent la stabilité maritale. Néanmoins, nos résultats montrent que l'hypothèse de base de symétrie entre...

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Commitment and Dependency in Marriage

Cited by 69 publications

References 11 publications

Family life in power couples.

Family life in power couples.

Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples

Economic Determinants of Divorce Among Dual-Earner Couples: Jews in Israel

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