Commissions of inquiry and policy change: Comparative analysis and future research frontiers

Abstract

Canadian governments have spawned hundreds of federal and provincial commissions of inquiry (COIs). Many scholars have completed in-depth analysis of particular COIs but less attention has been paid to policy impact and comparisons across COIs. This study addresses the following questions. What role do COIs play in policy change? Would policy change likely have occurred without the COI? Why do some COIs result in policy change and others do not? This analysis reports on findings from in-depth case studies of ten COIs. It uses a theoretical framework focusing on ideas, institutions, actors and relations to examine whether and how COIs lead to policy and administrative change. Sommaire : Le paysage de l'administration et de la politique publique canadienne a et e un terrain fertile pour des centaines de commissions d'enquête f ed erales et provinciales (CI). De nombreux chercheurs ont effectu e des analyses en profondeur de commissions d'enquête (CI) particulières, mais moins d'attention a et e accord ee aux r epercussions qu'elles ont sur les politiques et aux comparaisons entre les CI. Cette etude se penche sur les questions suivantes : Quel rôle jouent les CI dans les changements de politiques? Des changements d'orientation seraient-ils survenus sans les CI? Pourquoi certaines CI entraînent-elles des r esultats en matière de changements de politiques et d'autres non? Cette analyse offre des r esultats d' etudes de cas approfondies de dix CI. Elle se sert d'un cadre th eorique ax e sur les id ees, les institutions, les acteurs et les relations afin d'examiner si et comment les commissions d'enquête entraînent des changements administratifs et des changements de politiques.

Political and administrative control of expert groups—A mixed‐methods study

“…By contrast, a number of specific studies of expert groups and advisory commissions have taken interest in the question of control, pointing to situations where expert groups have been appointed to validate political preferences and legitimize controversial decisions (Ashfort, 1990; Salter, 1988), structured and mandated in ways that limit commissions' leeway to present independent recommendations and evidence (Hunter & Boswell, 2015), and ignored due to politically ill‐received recommendations (Bulmer, 1981; Inwood & Johns, 2016). Yet, much of this literature relies on single, in‐depth case studies of a small set of cases (Inwood, 2005; Prasser & Tracey, 2014; Rowe & McAllister, 2006) or study expert groups appointed within specific policy areas, such as financial issues or immigration (Hunter & Boswell, 2015; Marier, 2009; Owens, 2015).…”

Advocacy coalitions and flood insurance: Power and policies in the Australian Natural Disaster Insurance Review

“…He proposes the application of the ACF to inquiry analysis, and hypothesises, "inquiries can be influenced by the core beliefs of advocacy coalitions" (p. 15). Although Weaver-Hightower (2014) and Inwood and Johns (2016) discuss various actors in their analyses of public inquiries, in neither of these papers are the actors analysed as advocacy coalitions, and the phase of inquiry recommendation implementation is not considered. Instead, this latter gap is identified as an avenue for further research (Inwood and Johns, 2016).…”

From self‐determination to service delivery: Assessing Indigenous inclusion in municipal governance in Canada

“…Annual allocations of two billion dollars would be required for building health centres, stimulating the Indigenous economy, upgrading housing and building community centres (Feschuk ). While RCAP was successful in giving voice to Indigenous Peoples, it had limited impact on policy change (Inwood and Johns ).…”