2006 Ieee/Aiaa 25TH Digital Avionics Systems Conference 2006
DOI: 10.1109/dasc.2006.313761
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Commercial Aircraft Information Security-an Overview of ARINC Report 811

Abstract: In today's highly competitive air travel market, there is a growing demand among commercial airlines for on-aircraft systems, applications, and services that reduce airline operating costs, increase revenue opportunities, and improve the passenger experience. Systems such as Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) will improve efficiency of pre-flight and post-flight procedures and in-flight decision support. Enhanced communication, navigation, and surveillance systems will improve routing efficiency and situational aware… Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…In-aircraft [29] Use of ethernet for in-aircraft networking [28] In-aircraft network security guidelines for airlines [30] Use of personal wireless devices onboard EDS [13] Airplane software certification [19] Signed crate format for secure EDS AHM [31] Use of passive radio frequency identification tags onboard with passwords ATC [26] ADS-B standards & applications for traffic beacons Current guidance for airplane airworthiness from aviation regulatory agencies, e.g., [13], do not cover emerging security threats to the e-enabled airplane [14], [15], [16], [10]. Therefore, to ensure a safe, secure, reliable and efficient air transportation system with high capacity, security of the eenabled airplane must be addressed.…”
Section: Application Standard Descriptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…In-aircraft [29] Use of ethernet for in-aircraft networking [28] In-aircraft network security guidelines for airlines [30] Use of personal wireless devices onboard EDS [13] Airplane software certification [19] Signed crate format for secure EDS AHM [31] Use of passive radio frequency identification tags onboard with passwords ATC [26] ADS-B standards & applications for traffic beacons Current guidance for airplane airworthiness from aviation regulatory agencies, e.g., [13], do not cover emerging security threats to the e-enabled airplane [14], [15], [16], [10]. Therefore, to ensure a safe, secure, reliable and efficient air transportation system with high capacity, security of the eenabled airplane must be addressed.…”
Section: Application Standard Descriptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An ethernet-based architecture that protects flightcritical in-aircraft network systems from unauthorized access is in [29]. In [28], this architecture is improved with security mechanisms meeting airline constraints.…”
Section: B E-enabled Airplane Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…ARINC 811 recommends an aircraft network architecture that securely separates the flight critical systems from others and also presents a framework to identify protection mechanisms for in-aircraft network that can account airline needs and constraints. 25 RTCA Special Committee SC-202 is now considering the interference from onboard transmitting personal electronic devices (e.g., cellular devices, active RFID tags, embedded medical sensors) on the aircraft, and making recommendations for their use in RTCA DO-294B. Further, SAE AS5678 is a developing standard which identifies requirements for the use of passive RFID tags onboard and currently recommends use of password based mechanisms for RFID tag security.…”
Section: B Emerging Security Standards For the E-enabled Aircraftmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This could create security risks to other passengers, and reduce passengers' confidence in the airlines operation, and the aircraft's wireless systems by potentially decreasing the safety margins. [3][4][5] Vital network components are physically separated from the passenger cabin and cargo by reinforced walls and the cockpit door, and can be virtually separated from passenger wireless access through firewalls and cryptographic protocols. However, the nature of the wireless medium for networked communication introduces critical vulnerabilities into the aircraft's wireless systems, most notably through jamming based denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%